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INTRODUCTION 
  
 This Article contributes a new transactional alternative to address risks of 
catastrophic audit failure: having auditing firms issue bonds to capital markets (called 
catastrophe bond securitizations) to provide coverage for these risks.  This innovation 
follows from the Article’s analysis of longstanding debates about the relative merits of 
establishing caps on damages for auditing firms in securities liability cases.  In those 
debates, a common argument favoring caps is the absence or limited availability of 
insurance to address the liability.  This forces auditors to resort to self-insurance 
programs that they operate through captive affiliates. This Article’s transactional 
proposal responds to this insurance-based argument.   
 
 On the evidence available, self-insurance appears to be better than external 
insurance so that the insurance-based argument does not necessarily support damages 
caps.  The former bundles risk monitoring and distribution within audit firms whereas the 
latter separates the two functions.  Even if the argument were valid, moreover, the inquiry 
reveals superior alternatives that can be designed to address losses arising from audit 
failure.  These are (1) financial statement insurance—which has been discussed in the 
literature and tailors coverage to risks of ordinary audit failure and (2) catastrophe bond 
securitization—which has not been mentioned in the literature and is introduced here as a 
way to pool and distribute risks of catastrophic audit failure through capital markets.  The 
former bundles risk monitoring and distribution within insurers while the latter re-
bundles them outward to capital markets.   
 
 The Article thus tentatively concludes that the insurance-based argument favoring 
damages caps warrants analytical skepticism.  Analytical skepticism is the most the 
conclusion can reach, however, because the evidence available for a definitive 
determination is limited.  Auditing firms, which are privately owned, provide virtually no 
public information necessary to evaluate these issues.  Auditing firms do not publicly 
disclose any meaningful information about their financial condition or results, disclosing 
instead summary data on assets and total worldwide revenues broken down by 
geographic region and business line.  They provide no disclosure concerning internal or 
external insurance models or capacity and only cursory information about internal 
organizational structures, controls or governance.  In the course of some of the following 
analysis, therefore, an inferential picture of practices is developed. 
 
 Subject to those limits, after reviewing the terms of debate and introducing basic 
principles concerning the role of insurance in public policy governing auditing, the 
Article explores two alternative models that exist and two that could be created to address 
auditor liability for audit failure.  The first of the two existing models is, of course, 
traditional professional liability insurance, still commonly obtained by smaller and 
medium-sized auditing firms and once commonly used by the four large auditing firms 
but now only to a modest, specialized extent.  Remarkable about this form of insurance is 
how it separates the monitoring by auditors from distribution of the risk of audit failure.  
This separation or unbundling of risk monitoring and risk distribution can contribute 
comparative disadvantages to the audit function. 
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 In comparison, the second of the two existing models are more recently-evolved 
self-insurance programs.  Beginning sometime in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
large auditing firms all developed highly-sophisticated internal structures using captive 
insurance affiliates to manage and fund exposure to legal liability for audit failure.  While 
some participants in the debate view this as evidence of the firms’ dire straits, analysis 
supports the view that the decision to self-insure is both rational for the firms and 
relatively appealing systemically.  Most notably, compared to the unbundling and 
separation of functions that external insurance presents, self-insurance programs bundle 
the monitoring and risk-distribution functions together within audit firms. 
 
 As for two new possible alternatives to address audit failure, the first of these is 
financial statement insurance, which has been discussed somewhat in the literature, and is 
summarized briefly here.  Rather than auditors using professional liability insurance or 
self-insuring against the risk of liability from audit failure, this insurance covers 
particular financial statements.  Issuers buy coverage from external insurers which, in 
turn, engage auditors to conduct financial statement audits with the resulting insurance 
covering those statements.  Like self-insurance, this device bundles monitoring and risk 
distribution, although it bundles them into insurers rather than into audit firms. Even so, 
in a regime of financial statement insurance, existing commercial insurers as well as 
existing audit firm captives could compete to underwrite coverage. 
 
 The second novel alternative is insurance-based securitization, which has not been 
mentioned in the literature, and is introduced here.  Since 1995, financial innovators have 
packaged insurance-like products into securities using special purpose entities that pool 
and distribute risks through capital markets.  Insurance securitizations have concentrated 
on risks of catastrophic loss arising from such phenomena as hurricanes and floods.  But, 
to date, they have not included professional liability insurance of the kind auditors have 
obtained externally or developed internally.  While this market remains young and thin, 
as it matures and deepens, it could be an attractive vehicle to contribute resolution to the 
longstanding debate over damages caps for auditors by establishing a vehicle to cover 
catastrophic losses.  
 
 Intriguing about insurance-based securitization of risks of audit failure is how this 
could partially re-bundle the risk-monitoring and risk-distribution functions outward to 
capital markets.  Investors can essentially invest in functional insurance policies covering 
the risk of audit failure.  So using capital markets can reduce insurance market volatility 
that appears to be at the heart of insurance-based arguments favoring damages caps. It 
could add pressure on auditors to promote audit effectiveness and possibly reduce the 
incentives that plaintiffs’ lawyers have to pursue excessive damages claims against 
auditors of public companies, an important adjunct of such insurance-based arguments.  
Best of all, it can precisely address catastrophic audit failure risk which, most seem 
agreed, is the most important context in which damages caps warrant serious policy 
consideration. 
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 Part I summarizes the audit function and debates over damages caps.  The latter 
are often supported by lamenting a lack of insurance, absence of insurability or, 
sometimes, an “insurance crisis.”  Part II considers existing insurance for audit failure.  It 
evaluates how audit failure risk may be better addressed by self-insurance than by 
traditional liability insurance because of closer bundling of risk monitoring with risk 
distribution.  Part III explores potential insurance for audit failure.  It reviews previous 
proposals for financial statement insurance to address ordinary risks of audit failure and 
then introduces the novel idea of insurance-based securitization to address catastrophic 
risks of audit failure.   
 
I.  AUDIT FAILURE: RISK AND CONTROL 
 
 The following discussion introduces the parameters and stakes of the audit 
function, considers public policy matters implicated and addresses the role of insurance 
in policy design.  The stakes of audit failure are potentially staggering when only four 
large firms are competent to audit the vast majority of public enterprises.  This has 
revived debates dating back several decades about whether law should set limits on 
damages auditors face for audit failure, in which proponents often cite the relative 
absence or expense of related insurance. 
 
A.  Audit Constituents and Stakes 
  
 The audit function addresses multiple constituent classes and, within each class, 
many variations of type. The primary constituent is investors (who range from 
sophisticated institutions to retail clients investing personal funds).  The secondary class 
is issuers (which can be of any form, including non-profits and for-profits, private 
enterprises or public).  Tertiary constituents include other participants in financial 
reporting, chiefly an issuer’s officers and directors (especially its audit committee) and 
professional advisors (mainly lawyers and underwriters).  The latter group also includes 
insurers (of issuers, directors and officers and professional service firms, including 
auditors) along with regulators (mainly the SEC, but including state and securities and 
insurance regulators) and courts (federal and state).   
 
 As a group, auditors exhibit some variation in kind. They may usefully be 
grouped in three tiers measured by size (either by total revenues or total employees or 
professionals, which tend to be commensurate measures).  The largest firms generate 
annual global revenues approaching $20 billion apiece, employ more than 100,000 
people each (a large portion of whom are accounting professionals) and operate in nearly 
every country in the world.  There are presently four firms in this league (and there have 
never been more than eight in recent decades) and they increasingly bear a fairly 
homogenous character.  A mezzanine tier of medium-sized firms generate a fraction of 
those revenues with a fractional employee base (revenues are closer to $1 billion at the 
high end of the scale).  Thousands of yet smaller firms populate the third tier in the 
accounting profession.  The four largest firms audit the vast majority of public enterprises 
in the world, although mezzanine tier firms audit a meaningful share. 
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 At stake in any audit for a given issuer is the production of relevant and reliable 
financial statements that enable investors to make efficient capital allocation decisions.  
At stake for the audit function as a system is social welfare, which is a product of the 
relative efficiency of overall capital allocation.  Investors buy securities from issuers in 
part on the strength of reported accounting.  The reports are prepared by management and 
attested to by an auditor, under the supervision of an audit committee.   
 
 Audit failure means that an auditor issued an opinion that financial statements 
fairly present an issuer’s financial condition and results in conformity with generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) when, it turns out, the opinion was incorrect.  
Under federal law, a limited risk of auditor liability for negligence exists in connection 
with initial securities offerings, although most federal law actions involve secondary 
market trading and require a showing of scienter for private actions.1  On the other hand, 
under many state laws, negligence liability risk is considerable when relaxed privity 
standards apply instead of the more rigorous traditional privity requirement established in 
Judge Cardozo’s classic opinion Ultramares Corp. v. Touche.2  Federal law imposes 
further jurisdictional limitations on what kinds of securities-related claims may be 
brought in state compared to federal court.3 
 
 The magnitude of legal liability that auditors face for audit failure ranges from 
routine claims not posing systemic calamity (in the range of $10,000 to $250,000 whose 
significance for individual firms varies with firm size) to episodic claims involving 
hundreds of millions of dollars that could be systemically catastrophic.  The frequency of 
                                                 
1 Principal federal laws are Section 11 under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k, and Section 10(b) 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j.  The latter applies to secondary trading in 
securities and exposes auditors to liability under fraud theories (scienter); the former applies to registered 
public offerings of securities and exposes auditors to nominally strict liability, which becomes essentially a 
negligence standard because auditors defeat liability by showing reasonable investigation and belief and 
also depends on the investor’s ability to prove tracing.  Other federal laws include Section 17(a) of the 
Securities Act of 1933, which imposes on auditors the duties of inquiry and disclosure, 15 U.S.C. § 
77(q)(a), and Section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, which creates private rights of action against 
persons, including accountants, who “make or cause to be made” materially misleading statements in 
reports or other documents filed with the SEC, 15 U.S.C. § 78r. 
 
2  255 N.Y. 170 (1931).  The privity rule essentially forecloses public shareholder claims against auditors.  
Beginning in the 1980s, several state law cases overturned that principle, including Rosenblum v. Adler, 
461 A.2d 138 (1983), although a few courts clung to a watered-down version of the privity rule based on a 
foreseen plaintiff principle as articulated in the Restatement (Third) of Torts.  See Bily v. Arthur Young & 
Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992). Auditors also face a remote chance of criminal liability for audit failure that, 
if occurring, can have high-magnitude effects. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen’s Fall from Grace, 81 
WASH. U. L. Q. 917 (2003); United States v. Arthur Andersen, 374 F.3d 281, 289-91 (5th Cir. 2004), rev’d 
on other grounds, 544 U.S. 1042 (2005).  But criminal liability cannot be effectively addressed using either 
insurance or caps on damages.  
 
3 See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), Pub. Law No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 
3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (restricting securities fraud class actions to federal court, 
although not covering individual actions or derivative litigation in state court); see Richard W. Painter, 
Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1998). 
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relatively routine exposures is meaningful but not catastrophic: for smaller firms, perhaps 
once per year and, for larger firms, perhaps a dozen per year.   
 
 For larger cases, debate exists concerning their relative probability, which some 
confidently believe is high while others are less certain.4   Federal securities fraud class 
actions against auditors are few, but the size of resulting damages or settlements can be 
staggering, with four recent settlements reaching into the $200 and $300 million range 
and two others also exceeding $100 million.5  At much higher levels, it could be 
impossible for an auditing firm to continue in the face of such a payout.  Whichever view 
in the debate on probability is correct, the magnitude of loss is overwhelming—it could 
spell the demise of one of the four large auditing firms which, in turn, could threaten the 
industry’s viability.6 
 
B.  Public Policy 
 
 Policy discussions, which date back decades, consider mechanisms to improve the 
audit function and manage systemic effects of audit failure.  Analysis considers 
promoting year-to-year audit effectiveness, striking the optimal level of deterrence based 
on liability standards and, particularly in recent years, preventing cataclysmic audit 
failure. 
 
 Two kinds of tools can be used to promote the effectiveness of the audit function. 
The first concerns structural arrangements designed to induce professional skepticism and 
objectivity among auditors.  The second concerns liability devices designed to deter 
auditors—and their clients—from temptations to mis-report.  The liability system is also 
designed, in part, to provide compensation to investors who suffer damages from audit 
failure caused by violations of law. 
 
                                                 
4 Two models suggest high probability of medium-term, litigation-induced exit of a one of the four large 
auditing firms.  See Eric H. Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk among Big-Four Auditors: An Empirical 
Analysis, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1641 (2006); LONDON ECONOMICS & RALF EWERT, STUDY ON THE 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AUDITORS’ LIABILITY REGIMES (Sept. 2006) (study examining existing and possible 
caps on auditor damages in Europe) [hereinafter, EWERT, EU STUDY]. 
 
5 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 
84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 342 (2004) (detailing five settlements through 2004 exceeding $100 million: 
settlements of $110 million, $125 million, $217 million, $250 million and $335 million); Talley, supra note 
___, at 1670 (noting Fortress Re settlement in 2005 of $250 million).  Despite these figures, it is not 
uncommon for commentators, or judges, to speak of the potential of “billion dollar judgments” against 
auditors. E.g., John Cummings, Top of Mind: Do Accountants Need Liability Protection?, 
BUSINESSFINANCEMAG.COM (April 7, 2007) (quoting Deloitte CEO Robert Kueppers as concerned about 
“the multibillion-dollar claim” and mentioning figures of $3 billion, $5 billion or $10 billion); Bily v. 
Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992) (expressing concern about the “specter of multi-billion 
dollar judgments” against auditors). 
 
6  Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to Restructure the 
Industry before it Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1698 (2006) [hereinafter, Cunningham, Too Big to Fail]. 
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 Policymakers and scholars endlessly work to refine these tools in light of 
dynamically changing circumstances to achieve the optimal system.  Throughout related 
debates, arguments for limitations on auditing firm liability tend to change over time as 
markets, reforms and laws evolve, but they invariably and steadily appeal to absence or 
expense of insurance.  
 
 1.  Audit Effectiveness — Considerable changes have been made in the past five 
years in an effort to promote more effective audits.    A leading example is the creation of 
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) as an oversight body to 
supervise and regulate the public company auditing industry.7  Specific reforms designed 
to improve audit effectiveness include: (1) requiring audit committee supervision of the 
audit function; (2) tightening limits on an auditor’s right to provide non-audit services to 
audit clients; and (3) providing for audits of internal control over financial reporting.8  
Some proponents of capping auditor damages cite these changes to support the 
prescription.9 
 
 While such reforms likely improve the audit function and reduce risk of audit 
failure, their probable success is qualified.  Before considering qualifications as to each 
of the foregoing reforms, a continuing structural feature constraining audit effectiveness 
must be emphasized: issuers still pay their auditors.  This creates an inherent conflict of 
interest that can impair auditor objectivity and thus reduce audit effectiveness.  While 
many proposals have been made to eliminate this conflict, none has been adopted in the 
United States.10 
 
                                                 
7 Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (Nov. 2006) [hereinafter, Paulson Committee Report]. 
 
8 This is a partial list of reforms mandated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act but these are the main reforms.  More 
modest reforms include federal law mandating audit partner rotation on given engagements every five 
years, modest because this was previously an auditing requirement set at seven years. Bolder reform would 
require audit firm rotation, but this poses difficult questions that are hotly debated, including as to whether 
the familiarity that arises from repeat audits is a benefit that outweighs any gains (such as from 
independence, objectivity or competition) from mandatory firm rotation.  See U.S. Government Accounting 
Office, Public Accounting Firms: Required Study on the Potential Effects of Mandatory Audit Firm 
Rotation (Nov. 2003). 
 
9 E.g., Paulson Committee Report, supra note ___, at ___. 
 
10 Alternatives have been proposed to address the payment conflict for auditors as well as for other 
intermediaries, including financial statement insurance, public funding, funding through stock exchanges or 
voucher financing programs.  See, respectively, Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The 
Financial Statement Insurance Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. 413 (2004) (as discussed 
further in Part III, instead of having companies pay auditors, authorizing them to buy insurance and having 
insurers hire and pay auditors); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of 
Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 29, n. 180 (suggesting but discounting possibility of having 
gatekeepers such as auditors paid through public funding); Larry E. Ribstein, SarbOx: The Road to 
Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 279, 289 (citing Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, How the Quest for 
Efficiency Corroded the Market, HARV. BUS. REV., July 2003, at 76 (having the stock exchanges coordinate 
and compensate auditors)); Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing 
Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269 (2003). 
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 As for reforms that have been made, PCAOB faces inherent limitations as a 
matter of institutional capability to promote effective auditing.  True, PCAOB appears to 
be a more pro-active overseer than its predecessors, but that conscientiousness has 
created credible political objections to its performance. These objections have led 
political leaders and regulatory officials to reconsider many of its efforts.   
 
 The striking example concerns PCAOB’s standards governing audits of internal 
control over financial reporting.  While such audits can increase financial statement 
reliability, this is the leading context in which participants have alleged that PCAOB 
over-reached.11  Accordingly, not only is PCAOB’s existence a non-compelling argument 
for establishing caps, criticism of its handling of internal control audits also neutralizes 
the argument favoring caps based on the existence of those audits.   
 
 As to audit committee supervision, this may be one of the most important of the 
recent reforms.12  For many enterprises, this reform can strongly promote audit 
effectiveness.  Marking an important shift, recent reforms require that members of audit 
committees possess some expertise in financial accounting.13  This is a striking change in 
corporate governance discussions, which for several generations have emphasized the 
quality of independence rather than expertise.14  There is emerging evidence that having 
expertise on the audit committee increases the quality of financial reporting.15  That said, 
reliance on this important innovation may be premature.16 
                                                 
11 See SEC Press Release, SEC Commissioners Endorse Improved Sarbanes-Oxley Implementation To 
Ease Smaller Company Burdens, Focusing Effort On “What Truly Matters,” (April 4, 2007), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-62.htm.  At its open public meeting on July 25, 2007, the SEC 
approved a replacement standard governing audits of internal controls over financial reporting in lieu of the 
one that the PCAOB initially adopted.   
 
12 See William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules versus Principles versus Rents, 
48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1034-36 (2003) (noting importance of empowering audit committees to supervise 
auditors, discuss auditor-management disagreements, and retain own professional adviros). 
 
13 See Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Securities Act Release No. 8220, 
Exchange Act Release No. 47,654, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,001, 79 SEC Docket 2876 
(Apr. 9, 2003); 17 C.F.R. §240.10A-3(b) (2007) (codifying Exchange Act Rule 10A-3(b)). 
 
14 The trait of director independence emerged as an important value in corporate governance when the 
monitoring board replaced the advisory board during the 1970s.  See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of 
Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007).  Ever since, independence rather than expertise has been the clarion attribute of 
“good corporate governance.” See Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 1817 (2007).   
 
15 Jean Bedard et al., The Effect of Audit Committee Expertise, Independence, and Activity on Aggressive 
Earnings Management, 23 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 13 (2004); Gopal V. Krishnan & Gnanakumar 
Visvanathan, Does the Sox Definition of an Accounting Expert Matter? The Association Between Audit 
Committee Director’s Expertise and Conservatism, http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=866884. 
 
16 For example, an emerging debate concerns whether audit committee experts, and others engaged in the 
financial reporting process, should promote a financial statement orientation towards equity investors or 
debt investors.  At stake is the degree to which historical cost or fair value accounting should be preferred.  
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 Limiting non-audit services may promote audit effectiveness, although evidence 
is mixed,17 and in any event creates other concerns.  At present, some issuers of public 
securities face limited or no choice of auditors and, if only three large audit firms were to 
exist, many would have no choice.  This restricted choice, which exists in part because of 
the small number of capable firms, is amplified by both legal limits on non-audit services 
firms can supply to clients and the auditing industry’s practice of firm specialization in 
certain industries.  To the extent that only such a small coterie of firms are capable of 
auditing the vast majority of public enterprises, a risk arises that firm partners and 
employees may consider their firms “too big to fail,” which could impair rather than 
promote effective auditing.18  Damages caps could have a similar unintended side-effect. 
 
 2. Deterrence — The second category of tools available to promote effective 
auditing concentrate on deterrence, both as to auditors and their clients.  Deterrence 
strategies pursue designing the optimal type and scope of legal duties and liabilities that 
auditors and others have.  As with structural tools, policymakers and scholars regularly 
reevaluate system design and law periodically changes in response to debates.  Issues 
include the standard of liability (from negligence to scienter),19 the scope of exposure 
(from primary to aiding-and-abetting),20 and adjective devices (such as statutes of 
limitation,21 pleading standards22 or jurisdictional limitations23). 
                                                                                                                                                 
This hinges, in turn, on issues such as whether value relevance (usefulness) or efficient debt contracting are 
important components of the demand for accounting reports.  See, e.g., Ray Ball, Ashok Robin & Gil 
Sadka, Is Accounting Conservatism Due to Debt or Share Markets?  A Test of “Contracting” Versus 
“Value Relevance” Theories of Accounting (Feb. 27, 2005); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, 
Independence, Expertise and Accounting (draft manuscript August 2007). 
 
17 E.g., William R. Kinney, Jr., Zoe-Vonna Palmrose & Susan Scholz, Auditor Independence, Non-Audit 
Services and Restatements: Was the US Government Right?, 42 J. ACCT. RES. 561 (2004); see also Jayanthi 
Krishnan, Heibatollah Sami & Yinqi Zhang, Does the Provision of Nonaudit Services Affect Investor 
Perceptions of Auditor Independence?, 24 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 111 (2005) (noting mixed results 
of empirical research on the effect of non-auditing services on auditor independence and investigating 
whether investors perceive such an effect—and interpreting the results affirmatively). 
 
18 See Cunningham, Too Big to Fail, supra note ___. 
 
19 Compare Ultramares; supra note ___; with Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) 
(restricting Section 10b actions to scienter, not negligence). 
 
20 See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (Section 10b does 
not expose auditors (or other professionals) in private litigation to liability for adding and abetting 
securities fraud); Robert A. Prentice, Locating That “Indistinct” and “Virtually Nonexistent” Line Between 
Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. REV. 691 (1997); Donald C. Langevoort, 
Words on High About Rule 10b-5: Chiarella’s History, Central Bank’s Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865 
(1995). 
 
21 For Section 10(b) actions, the current statute of limitations period is two-years-from-constructive 
knowledge, subject to a maximum five-year period of repose.  15 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (negating Lampf, Pleva, 
Lipkind & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991), which provided a one-year-from-constructive-
knowledge limitations period, subject to a three-year period of repose, in turn altering the traditional 
judicial approach of borrowing relevant limitations period from analogous common law fraud context). 
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 Detailed exploration of this terrain is unnecessary to conduct this Article’s 
principal inquiry, except to note that optimality means sufficient deterrence at reasonable 
cost.  Sub-optimality can arise from a liability regime in which potential damages are so 
high that they induce over-auditing or so high that imposing them on a firm could lead to 
its dissolution and the auditing industry to unravel.  It is possible to address these 
problems by creating limitations on damages.  Various types of limitations are possible, 
including safe harbors, proportionate liability and stated damages caps (which, in turn, 
can assume many forms).24  
 
 As to safe harbors, they can fairly and usefully be justified for certain auditing 
practices.  An example concerns audits of internal control over financial reporting to the 
extent that auditors make forward-looking statements in their related reports on the 
relative effectiveness of those controls.25  These have not been adopted and this Article 
does not address them directly.  It does contribute insights, however, concerning any 
arguments supporting safe harbors that are based on the absence or limited availability of 
external insurance.   
 
 As to proportionate liability,  in 1995, the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act (PSLRA) eliminated joint-and-several liability for negligence, replacing it with 
liability in proportion to fault.26   This is, in substance and effect, a functional damages 
cap.27  Proportionate liability caps auditor liability at the level of culpability so that 
auditors are not exposed to all losses from financial calamity arising after an audit failure 
occurs.   A theoretical defense of this limitation was made in 1984 by Professor Ebke.28  
                                                                                                                                                 
22 See [Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., ___ U.S. ___ (2007)]; Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 
(2d Cir. 2000) (interpreting pleading standards that Congress enacted in 1995 to endorse pre-existing 
Second Circuit approach requiring that pleadings demonstrate “strong inference” of scienter); see also In re 
Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999).  
 
23 See SLUSA, supra note ___. 
 
24 An additional functional cap arises when firms opt to use the limited liability partnership form of 
business organization, which all four large auditing firms have adopted since this became possible in the 
early 1990s.  See Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability of Professional Firms After Enron, 29 IOWA J. CORP. 
L. 427, 447 (2004). 
 
25 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Facilitating Auditing’s New Early Warning System: Control Disclosure, 
Auditor Liability and Safe Harbors, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1451 (2004). 
 
26  Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 758 
codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4.   
 
27 See EWERT, EU STUDY, supra note ___, at ___. 
 
28 Werner F. Ebke, In Search of Alternatives: Comparative Reflections on Corporate Governance and the 
Independent Auditors’ Responsibilities, 79 NW. L. REV. 663 (1984) (inspired by and studying negligent 
accountant cases altering Ultrameres, preceding Bily).  Professor Ebke also mentioned, in passing, another 
option for risk distribution by creating a federal insurance fund akin to FDIC.  
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The analysis emphasizes the need for a link between the extent of auditors’ fault and 
resulting liability.29   
 
 As to stated damages caps, these have been debated since at least the 1970s.30  
Three varieties can be identified: fixed dollar, variable dollar and fixed percentage.  They 
can be implemented by legislation, regulation or contract.  A primary criticism of any 
variety of caps, of course, is that they reduce the deterrent effect of the liability threat.  
But that criticism misses the point, which is to design the system to achieve optimal 
deterrence, not maximal deterrence.31  A cap could contribute to the optimum.32 
 
 Professor Ebke also evaluated fixed dollar caps in 1984.  He noted that the main 
benefit to fixed caps is to improve risk analysis, by either the auditing firms or their 
insurers.  Optimal design would assure that auditor exposure is not out of proportion to 
auditor gain.  Yet to be effective for risk analysis, the amounts would have to be 
relatively low.  But this means, in turn, that fixed caps per case would be both unfair and 
                                                 
29  Professor Ebke also recommended that state courts adapt federal law’s scienter standard into analysis of 
non-privity cases.  Ebke, In Search of Alternatives, supra note ___, at 695.  He suggested that if scienter 
can be shown then liability could expand to parties not in privity with the auditor but to require privity in 
all other cases (including negligence cases).  Doing so is appealing because the scienter standard keeps 
auditor liability within reasonable bounds while extending it to all foreseeable third parties; since insurance 
generally excludes coverage for scienter, liability’s deterrent effect remains. 
 
30  See, e.g., Ted J. Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants’ Responsibilities to Third Parties, 28 VAND. L. 
REV. 31 (1975) (proposing damages caps measured in terms of revenue for given client or total revenue).  
For a sampling of the literature across the decades, see Constantine N. Katsoris, Accountants’ Third Party 
Liability: How Far Do We Go?, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 191 (1968); Michael A. Mess, Accountants and The 
Common Law: Liability to Third Parties, 52 N.D. L. REV. 838 (1977); David L. Menzel, The Defense of 
Contributory Negligence in Accountant's Malpractice Actions, 13 SETON HALL L. REV. 292 (1983); 
Howard B. Wiener, Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for Negligent 
Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 233 (1983). 
 
31 Damages caps are not an uncommon component of a liability system’s design.  Early examples appeared 
in maritime law. See Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, 46 U.S.C. § 181 (maritime law designed to 
encourage investment in ship-building by capping owners’ liability at vessel’s net value).  Other examples 
appear in the ALI’s Federal Securities Code, insider trading class actions, some state corporate laws, as 
well as those sought by auditors for decades.  See, e.g., The Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities: 
Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations 154 (1978) (commission established by the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants known as the Cohen Commission); R. JAMES GORMLEY, THE LAW OF 
ACCOUNTANTS AND AUDITORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES 17-11 (1981).   
 
32 An additional challenge is federalism within the US and global coordination worldwide.  Within the US, 
any effective cap would require federal legislation that preempts contrary state laws.  Furthermore, given 
that the four large firms are global in scale, an additional challenge is assuring worldwide adoption of caps.  
This exercise is ongoing.  For example, both the UK Parliament and the European Union (EU) are flirting 
with the notion.  Notably, however, when first proposed, the Statute for European Companies and the Fifth 
Company Law Directive of the European Community did not provide statutory limitations on auditor 
damages. See Ebke, In Search of Alternatives, supra note ___, at 696 n. 172.  The EU’s pending project on 
the Eighth Company Law Directive has commissioned a study of the subject.  See EWERT, EU STUDY, 
supra note ___, at ___. 
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ineffective.  When the limit is too low, they would lead to nominal recoveries, but even 
low limits that provided fair recoveries could still pose a catastrophic risk for auditors. 
 
 If the main concern is the catastrophic case, then the cap would be some fairly 
large number today, in the range of $450 million to $2 billion (for smaller firms, perhaps 
$30 to $100 million).33  That could help with cutting out the mega-claim, but does not 
meet Professor Ebke’s objection about being sufficiently low to enable superior risk 
analysis.  Risks below that level are just as analytically tractable or intractable as without 
any cap. 
 
 Professor Fiflis’s 1975 proposal offered a variable dollar cap proposal.  It would 
cap damages either (a) for a given client’s audit, at a multiple of fees received from that 
client during a stated period or (b) for all clients, at a multiple of revenues from all clients 
for a period.  Criticism of Professor Fiflis’s proposal observed how investors in 
companies audited by smaller auditors stand to recover less than investors in companies 
audited by larger ones.  That would increase audit industry concentration as enterprises 
would tend to appoint larger firms.  That hurts smaller firms, increases prices, could 
reduce audit quality, and, if demand is relatively inelastic, hurts investors.  This critique 
is particularly apt today, when encouraging additional rivals to the dominant four firms 
is, for many, an important policy objective.34 
 
 The debate continues today. Professor Partnoy offers a fixed percentage approach 
to establishing caps on auditor liability for audit failure.35 He envisions statutory 
authorization to permit auditors and their clients to contract for allocation of damages 
from audit failure according to a stated split.  A question about the fixed percentage 
approach is whether it nevertheless could bankrupt an auditor. Even a small percentage of 
a large judgment could produce auditor insolvency.  As a result, Professor Coffee prefers 
the approach offered earlier by Professor Fiflis.36 Another concern of the fixed-
percentage approach is how publicity of such arrangements could also hurt smaller firms, 
which are less able to commit to high allocations, and thus poses the same adverse effects 
as multiples-based caps. 
 
 Related pending debates consider the extent to which auditors and clients should 
be permitted, in engagement letters, to control liability contractually.  Examples apart 
from the fixed-percentage proposal are contracts that require alternative dispute 
                                                 
33 See Talley, supra note ___, at 1679 (estimating viability thresholds of large auditing firms in terms of 
what level of damages they could support before likely electing to dissolve, with estimates from $454 
million to $2.15 billion). 
 
34 See US GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS: MANDATED STUDY ON CONSOLIDATION AND 
COMPETITION, STUDY ON AUDIT INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION (July 2003). 
 
35 See Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers:  A Reply to Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L. REV. 365 
(2004).   
 
36 See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform, supra note ___. 
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resolution (rather than jury trials) or expressly exclude punitive damages (although this 
exclusion already exists under federal securities law and under many state laws).37  
Debate also addresses the optimal vehicle to establish any caps.  Examples of alternatives 
means of implementing a cap are by regulatory formula (as in the proposals by Professor 
Fiflis and Professor Coffee), contractual negotiation (as in Professor Partnoy’s proposal) 
or by insurance-driven measurements (a proposal that Professor Ronen has made that I 
have endorsed).38  
 
 3.  The Insurance Argument — All the various proposals mentioned above, the 
relative merits of which are beyond this Article’s focus, share a common argument 
supporting them in principle: the relative expense or limited availability of insurance.39  
While the insurance-based argument is ultimately that simple, based on insurance 
expense and limits, more complex variations of the argument appear.  The first is the 
more subtle claim that the cause of expensive or limited insurance is legal uncertainty 
and/or unpredictably expanding legal liability.  Professor Ebke’s 1984 analysis, for 
example, expressed concern that “increased civil litigation” against auditors increases 
insurance premiums or restricts its availability “at any price.”40 
 
 The second is the more dramatic claim that rivets concern not on the quotidian 
case but on the catastrophic case from that unpredictable expansion: staggering liability 
threatening auditing firm insolvency with systemic ripple-effects that could demolish the 
entire auditing industry.  In the late 2000s, for example proponents of establishing 
damages caps for auditors arising from audit failure contend that caps below catastrophic 
levels “would allow insurers to re-enter this market.  Insurance would . . . . allow audit 
firms to price risk and create a source of recovery for shareholders.”41 
 
 While these more subtle and dramatic claims are worth separate attention, they 
ultimately do not make much of a difference to the basic argument from relative expense 
or limited availability of insurance.  After all, legal uncertainty is endemic and pervasive 
so it cannot be eliminated for auditing and is not unique to it.  And auditor-friendly 
                                                 
37 See Council of Institutional Investors, Roundtable Discussion on Auditor Agreements: Discussion 
Summary (Nov 10, 2005), www.cii.org; Interagency Report on Auditor Engagement Letters 
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2006/SR0604a1.pdf (opposing such provisions). 
 
38 See Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform:  Financial Statement Insurance and GAAP Revisited, 8 STAN. J. 
L. BUS. 39, 48-60 (2002) (issuers obtain insurance at pre-determined levels to cover their financial 
statements with benefits that include increased investor monitoring of financial statement reliability); see 
infra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
 
39 While the merits are beyond this Article’s scope, worth noting about proposing all auditor liability 
matters to be established by contract rather than tort law are two important facts: (1) the considerable 
agency costs embedded in the existing corporate governance structure which limits the probability that 
managers interact with auditors in favor of investor interests and (2) the oligopoly of the auditing industry 
that restricts issuer choice and reduces audit firm incentives to compete on service or product variation. 
 
40 See Ebke, supra note ___, at 690. 
 
41 Paulson Committee Report, supra note ___, at ___ 
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reform efforts are not directed so much to promoting legal certainty but to limiting legal 
liability.  That is the essence of a cap, for instance, which does not so much increase legal 
certainty as simply put an upper financial limit on legal judgments. 
 
 Indeed, legal certainty and predictability could be provided by a law such as 
always making auditors strictly liable in the amount of $200 million for every audit 
failure.  Yet despite the certainty and predictability of such a law, insurance could remain 
expensive and limited.  This is due, in part, to how uncertainty is a prerequisite to the 
effectiveness of insurance—as explained in the next section, events that are certain to 
occur do not benefit from the risk distribution function that insurance can provide.   
 
 True, unpredictability can impair insurance effectiveness and present catastrophic 
risk that insurance cannot cover.  However, analysis and empirical evidence indicates that 
expensive or limited insurance is not due solely to unpredictably expanding liability and 
accompanying catastrophic risk but also to traditional insurance limitations arising from 
moral hazard, adverse selection and the rarity of catastrophic cases.42  As explored in 
Parts II and III of this Article, while these matters pose difficulties for existing and 
potential insurance to address quotidian and catastrophic risk from audit failure, they also 
reduce the insurance-based argument to the basic claim of expense or limited availability 
of insurance rather than implicate the more subtle or dramatic theories about legal 
uncertainty or unpredictably expanding liability. 
 
 However conceived, the insurance-based argument resonates forcibly during 
periods when insurance markets contract.  Insurance markets expand and contract 
cyclically through periods designated as either “hard” or “soft” markets, in cycles that 
approximate seven years.43  As a thumb-nail sketch of such cyclicality, the market for 
professional liability insurance for auditors hardened considerably from the late 1970s 
through the early and mid-1980s, in partial response to increasing risk of negligence 
liability for audit failure;44 the market then softened in the late 1980s;45 it hardened again 
                                                 
42 See Peter Moizer & Lisa Hansford-Smith, UK Auditor Liability: An Insurable Risk?, 2 INT’L J. AUDITING 
197 (1999); see infra text accompanying notes ___-___ and ___-___. 
 
43 See FRANK CRYSTAL & CO., INSURANCE MARKET OVERVIEW 5 (Winter/Spring 2006) (“A hard market is 
one in which insurance rates increase (net written premiums increase substantially) and coverage tends to 
be relatively restricted.  A soft market is one in which rate reductions are common (net written premium 
increases only nominally) and broad coverage terms are readily available.  The cycle from hard market, to 
soft market and back to hard market occurs regularly at a peak-to-peak or trough-to-trough interval of 
approximately seven years.”). 
 
44 See John Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Institutional Tort Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 
1929, at n. 111 (1988) (evidence from (x) the late 1970s of a “sharp premium rise and exit of some firms 
from insurance market,” citing H. JAENICKE, THE EFFECT OF LITIGATION ON INDEPENDENT AUDITORS 4 (2d 
ed. 1981); (y) the early 1980s of loss claims that “resulted in insurance becoming unavailable or 
prohibitively expensive,” citing Collins, Malpractice Prevention and Risk Management, J. ACCT. 52 (July 
1986); and (z) the mid-1980s that number of E&O insurers to small and mezzanine firms shrunk from 12 to 
3). 
 
45 See Practising Law Institute (Accountants’ Liability 1989: The Year in Review), Developments in 
Liability Insurance, 653 PLI/CORP. 9 (July 1, 1989) (noting market softening with insurers writing policies 
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in the early 1990s in response to the dissolution of the firm of Laventhol & Horwath;46 
the market remained hard for a few years—and this appeared to be global rather than US-
specific;47 then it softened again in the late 1990s in partial response to the PSLRA and 
has hardened yet again since the early and mid-2000s amid both accounting scandals and 
resulting regulatory reform.48  The professional liability insurance market for auditors 
should soften further to the extent that such reforms increase audit effectiveness and 
reduce liability risk from audit failure.  At present, the market remains hard.49 
 
 This cyclicality—which is explored at more micro levels in the next Part—
presents a preliminary implication.  Proposals to cap liability that are supported by 
arguments about a lack of insurance may be unable to respond to the dynamics of those 
markets.  A legal mechanism would have to be in place to suspend and reinstate caps as 
insurance markets fluctuate.  Given competing demands on lawmakers and the difficulty 
                                                                                                                                                 
for small and medium-sized firms with larger limits of liability and inducing the insurer Crum & Forster, 
under an AICPA sponsored program, to increase limits to $5 million from $1 million and entry of Home 
Insurance Co. and Orion Insurance Co. but still noting difficulty of large firms obtaining high limit 
coverage and facing large deductibles so that insurance covered only catastrophic loss levels—meaning 
large firms must “in essence” self-insure smaller claims).  
 
46 See Robert A. Prentice, Can the Contributory Negligence Defense Contribute to a Defusing of the 
Accountant’s Liability Crisis?, 13 WIS. INT’L L.J. 359, 360-61 (1995) (high level of unresolved claims plus 
legal costs and demise of Laventhol & Horwath “made it nearly impossible for the [large auditing] firms to 
find insurance, and has caused approximately forty percent of smaller firms to go without insurance 
altogether”); id. at n. 13 (citing Michael Schachner, Big Six Losses Don’t Add up to Cover Crisis for Small 
Firms, BUS. INS., Nov. 22, 1993, at 3 (suggesting that “capacity has all but evaporated for Big Six firms, 
causing several to entirely self-insure”); id. (“Those who do buy insurance are paying much more than 
previously. Auditors, for example, are paying three times the premium with six times the deductible as 
compared to 1985. Some firms are paying premiums of $150,000 per year—more than is paid by most 
surgeons—for the reduced coverage”) (citations omitted).   
 
47 See Carl Pacini, Mary Jill Martin & Lynda Hamilton, At the Interface of Law and Accounting: An 
Examination of a Trend Toward A Reduction in the Scope of Auditor Liability to Third Parties in the 
Common Law Countries, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 171, 220-21 (2000) (“auditors have been unable to spread or 
socialize risk through the purchase of professional liability insurance. The unavailability of liability 
insurance may also reduce the quality of corporate financial reporting.”); id. at n. 384 (“In the United 
States, large accounting firms are now able to buy only a portion of the coverage they could buy prior to 
1985 and only for much higher premiums. Virtually all mid-size firms tend to be highly underinsured. 
Liability insurance for small firms is expensive with almost 50% not carrying any insurance at all”); id. at 
n. 384 (“In the United Kingdom, below $75 million the Big Five retain the risks themselves as self-
insurance using their own captive insurance companies. The effective ceiling on coverage is $340 million” 
(citing Peter Mozier & Lisa Hansford-Smith, UK Auditor Liability: An Insurable Risk, 2 INT’L J. AUDITING 
197, 204 (1998)); id. (“In Canada and Australia, the scale of the problem is such that auditors are finding it 
increasingly difficult to obtain insurance and that where it is available it is extremely expensive.”). 
 
48 See Dan L. Goldwasser, M. Thomas Arnold & John H. Eickemeyer, Accountants’ Liability, Ch. 11: 
Professional Liability Insurance, PLI, § 11.2 (Aug. 2006) [hereinafter Goldwasser, Arnold &. Eickemeyer, 
Accountants’ Liability (2006)] (“Although the market for professional liability insurance softened in the 
late 1990s, it has become tighter in the wake of the accounting scandals in 2001-2002 and the subsequent 
regulatory response”). 
 
49 See FRANK CRYSTAL & CO., INSURANCE MARKET OVERVIEW, supra note ___, at 5. 
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of fashioning legislation that includes sufficient prospective flexibility, a legislative 
solution to the challenge is not likely to work.  The observation does point in a more 
promising direction.  It could be desirable to develop mechanisms that reduce insurance 
market volatility, if not strategies that would expand and sustain availability for all 
time.50 
 
 The insurance-based argument for caps raises numerous issues, including the 
following.  Are insurers really not willing to provide this insurance?  Is there really no or 
little insurance available?  How does the existence of large firm self-insurance programs 
affect the analysis?  Are damages caps really necessary to support the efficacy of the 
audit function?  If rejuvenating insurance is appealing, are there alternatives that would 
enable doing so?  For example, could insurance cover financial statements rather than 
auditors?  This could contribute a mechanism other than fiat to establish caps, assuming 
caps were desirable, and thus at least address risks of ordinary audit failure.  Finally, 
could audit failure risk be distributed more widely by securitizing this risk through capital 
markets? Could insurance-based securitization reduce the volatility of professional 
liability insurance markets?  Could it at least be used to address the specific concerns 
associated with catastrophic audit failure risk? 
 
C. The Role of Insurance 
 
 Before pursuing such questions in the next two Parts, some initial perspective on 
the role of insurance in system design is in order.  It may seem backwards to design the 
parameters of a liability system in relation to the capacity of insurance coverage to meet 
it. The system should set liability to achieve optimal deterrence (or, perhaps, 
compensation).  But determining such an optimum requires examining all system 
components, including out-of-pocket costs imposed on targeted actors, the share of losses 
to be absorbed by insurance (or indemnification or other devices), the consequence of 
insurance losses as translated into future premiums and so on.  In this calculus, it is 
reasonable to evaluate the role and capacity of insurance in overall system design.   
 
 1.  Optimality — Allowing that insurance capacity should inform system design 
does not mean that its availability should be the basis for enlarging liability levels by 
assuming its continued availability nor should its lack of availability be the basis for the 
opposite.  Insurance and similar resources cannot be assumed to exist or not to exist.  
Insurance affordable today may not be affordable tomorrow and vice versa.51  
Accordingly, the investigation that follows is not intended to reach conclusions 
concerning the exact design of the liability system or the precise role insurance 
                                                 
50 See infra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
 
51 See, e.g., Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Institutional Tort Reform, supra note ___, at  
1948-49 (criticizing “the standard bromide of modern tort law: the use of insurance to offset tort liability” 
and then citing and discussing Rosenblum, supra, which “concluded that because accountants have been 
able to obtain malpractice insurance against claims made directly by their clients, there was ‘no reason to 
believe’ they could not similarly insure against third-party claims” and noting how this belief is 
“dangerously misguided”). 
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availability or unavailability should play in that design.  Rather, it is intended to identify 
and estimate the scope of available insurance and how to expand its availability so that 
the maximum level of potential resources can be identified and that knowledge can then 
be used to inform system design.52   
 
 Nor is this to conclude that maximizing the aggregate available insurance is 
necessarily ideal.  Perversely, expanding insurance capacity can actually reduce 
recoveries available to injured parties and this can frustrate any compensatory objectives 
that a liability system may be intended to achieve.53  While this peculiarity more nearly 
raises questions about the function of compensation in the liability system compared to 
deterrence, the two goals continue to play at least some role in policy design.  Still, 
evaluating claims of lack of insurance and promoting optimal system design (including as 
to damages caps) can be improved by an appreciation of the range and type of insurance 
products that can be fashioned to address risks.   
 
 2.  Statistical Independence — Risks are susceptible to the risk management 
functions of insurance if they are statistically independent of one another.  The risk of 
audit failure leading to legal liability generally satisfies this condition.  It cannot be 
predicted with certainty and it is not necessarily random.  Auditors can make reliable 
predictions and can even influence outcomes.  But fraud can be hidden, illegal acts 
obscured, measurements imprecise, papers lost and rogue managers evasive.  Audit 
failures occur through ordinary carelessness, actual negligence, gross negligence, and 
sometimes scienter.  Some audits are failures but are never uncovered as such.54   
 
 If these matters could be controlled, then prediction would be perfect. At the 
extreme, if two events both are certain to occur, insuring them does not contribute to risk 
pooling or distribution; even if two events are not certain to occur but likely to occur in 
exactly the same circumstances, insurance cannot contribute to risk distribution.  But if 
the risks have probabilities of occurring and those probabilities arise from different 
circumstances, then insurance is useful to pool and distribute both risks.  As there is 
invariably some non-random chance of audit failure (as there is with death, earthquakes, 
                                                 
52 See George L. Priest, The Antitrust Suits and the Public Understanding of Insurance, 63 TUL. L. REV. 
999 (1989) (“few would dispute that a central ambition of a civilized society is to maximize the availability 
of insurance against all forms of prospective loss” and “I believe this conclusion is the heart of the most 
influential philosophical justification for the modern state” (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
(1971)). 
 
53 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its 
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1553 n.74 (2006); compare Roberta Romano, What Went 
Wrong with Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (1989) (“The availability 
of insurance need not lead to an increased level of misconduct: in a competitive insurance market, even if 
insurers cannot monitor insureds perfectly, they can adjust insurance contract terms and offer partial 
insurance to mitigate the moral hazard of insurance inducing suboptimal levels of care by insureds” (citing 
Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL J. ECON. 120 (1982)). 
 
54  Bishop Berkeley might have asked, as with trees falling in unpopulated forests, whether an uncovered 
audit failure is really an audit failure. 
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floods and clouds on title), the condition is generally met: the risk of any given audit 
failure is statistically independent of the risk of any other and non-correlated.55 
 
 3. Limiting Probability — Two broad categories of strategies can be deployed to 
address risk by managing its two components: limiting the probability of occurrence and 
limiting magnitude if it does occur.  As to limiting probability, common examples outside 
auditing are driving carefully, using fire-resistant materials in buildings, installing safety 
devices on machines and engineering beach-erosion protection.   
 
 For auditing, steps to reduce the probability of legal liability from audit failure 
include the reforms in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act discussed earlier: installation of PCAOB 
as an oversight body for the industry; vesting audit committees with direct supervisory 
power over individual auditors; limiting the scope of non-audit services; and providing 
testing of and opinions on the effectiveness of internal controls.  Additional devices 
include increased probing, strategic detection tools, investing in training of personnel, 
and having multiple teams of professionals review the performance of the engagement (as 
when a firm dispatches an engagement team but provides oversight by the national 
office).   
 
 4.  Limiting Magnitude — As to limiting magnitude, steps are addressed to 
reducing the effects of a loss once it occurs.  Non-audit examples are using air bags and 
seat belts when driving, installing sprinkler systems in buildings and providing first-aid 
kits on shop floors.  For auditing, steps include prompt disclosure of corrections, swift 
preparation of financial restatements, continuous disclosure and, especially to address 
collateral effects, delisting of issued securities when they are accompanied by materially 
misleading financial statements.  It also includes developing reserve funds available to 
meet such losses without disrupting an ongoing enterprise.  
 
 Investors may exert themselves to reduce the magnitude of audit failure.  A key 
device available to them is diversification.56  Under modern portfolio theory, investors 
can reduce the risk of a single stock price drop by owning opposite-behaving stocks or a 
group of differently-behaving stocks.  The result is that peculiar risks associated with 
given securities are reduced (for the price of also reducing the “risk,” or positive chance, 
of a single stock price surge).  This theory is designed to address business volatility rather 
than effects precipitated by financial misstatements, but the strategy nevertheless can 
reduce the latter’s effects. 
 
                                                 
55 “Generally” because there is some reason to believe that certain kinds of audit failures—or audit failure 
risks—congregate in particular industries or proliferate during certain economic environments.  See David 
B. Kahn & Gary S. Lawson, Who’s the Boss? Controlling Auditor Incentives through Random Selection, 53 
EMORY L. J. 391, 428 (2004). 
 
56 In theory, public company shareholders are entitled to vote to ratify the selection of independent auditors 
but this selection is made by audit committees, rational shareholder apathy limits the exercise, and there is 
limited choice for most large enterprises.  
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 5. Distributing Residual Risk — Some risk remains even after taking prudent 
steps to reduce probability and magnitude.  The traditional way to distribute residual risk 
is by transferring it to another party using an insurance contract.   Risk-averse persons are 
willing to pay a relatively small but steady amount to avoid shouldering the risk of a 
possible one-time but staggering payout.  Insurance enables doing so.   
 
 At the limit, insureds can completely eliminate their risk for a price (premium): 
they opt for a certain small loss instead of an uncertain large loss (and if renewed 
annually, a certain stream of small losses in exchange for eliminating an uncertain large 
loss).  Insurers profit by pooling these individual risk-aversion payments to generate a 
resource base that exceeds the aggregate amount of probable losses.57  This pooling 
function thus not only transfers risk, it also distributes risk across all insureds in the 
pool.58 
 
 While risk-aversion is generally assumed to obtain across a wide range of persons 
for whom insurance appeals as a risk distribution mechanism, risk aversion can vary with 
absolute and relative stakes.  The standard example of risk aversion illustrates.  It 
imagines a person facing a choice between a certain loss of $500 and a 50% chance of 
losing $1,000 (meaning an expected loss of $500).  People who are risk averse choose the 
certain loss as they are averse to the risk of doubling it (while risk preferring people take 
that chance and risk neutral people are indifferent).   
 
 To see how risk aversion can vary with absolute stakes, imagine how increasing 
the stakes affects the distribution of persons who are risk averse (or risk neutral or risk 
preferring). The population of persons who are risk averse tends to increase as the stakes 
rise: given a choice between a certain loss of $1 and a 50% chance of losing $10,000 
(meaning an expected loss of $5,000), very few offered the choice would roll the dice. 
 
 To see how risk aversion can vary with relative stakes, consider how a decision-
maker’s background position affects choices made in the foregoing examples.  Suppose 
that persons in the first example command, respectively, a net worth of $1,000 and of $1 
million.  In that fact pattern, the former person will be more risk averse to the uncertainty 
of a $1,000 loss (for that person, such a loss wipes out net worth) compared to the 
millionaire (for whom such a loss is a drop in the net worth bucket).  A potential 
insured’s relative wealth can thus be an important driver of relative risk aversion. 
 
 Even so, the more risk averse one is, the more one is willing to pay to avoid risk.  
Avoidance strategies include paying a third party insurer to assume risk.  To modify the 
preceding examples, suppose that 100 risk-averse people each face a 1% chance of losing 
$1,000 (each faces an expected loss of $10).  But also suppose that they have the choice, 
                                                 
57 See EJAN MACKAAY, THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND LAW 173-80 (1982); A. MITCHELL 
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 53-58 (2d ed. 1989).   
 
58 See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 
(1986). 
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using insurance, to part with a certain $15 instead of facing that chance.  A third party 
might be willing to accept the $15 from each of those 100 people, grossing $1,500, in 
exchange for accepting the risk of having to pay $1,000.  If so, the result is an insurance 
market with 100 insureds paying the insurer to take each of their risks. 
 
II.   EXISTING INSURANCE FOR AUDIT FAILURE 
 
 Auditors (and investors) typically handle risk of legal liability in much the same 
way that others address kindred risks: monitoring risk to control it (limiting probability 
and magnitude) and using insurance to distribute the residual. This Part discusses two 
classes of tactics that auditors long have used to deal with the residual risk by distributing 
it: third-party insurance and self-insurance.  It tentatively concludes that self-insurance is 
comparatively superior to E&O insurance in promoting audit effectiveness. 
 
A.  Errors and Omissions (E&O) Insurance 
 
  Auditors have long used insurance to transfer and distribute risk of legal liability 
arising from audit failure.  The insurance is variously dubbed professional liability 
insurance, malpractice insurance or, most broadly, errors & omissions (E&O) insurance.  
Two general limitations accompany such insurance—moral hazard and adverse 
selection—plus several limitations that raise issues of peculiar significance to the audit 
function concerning monitoring. 
 
 1.  Moral Hazard — As to moral hazard, insureds who completely eliminate their 
risk for a price have lesser incentive to limit probability or magnitude than those who do 
not.  The result is that insurance can perversely increase both.  A theoretically appealing 
response to this problem is for insurers to monitor insureds and adjust premiums 
according to steps that each insured takes to minimize probability and magnitude.  
Ideally, premiums are then matched precisely to risks. Alas, when pooling risks, 
monitoring each insured is costly and sometimes impossible. A second-best strategy 
emerges of incomplete risk elimination—that is, having the insured retain some risk.  
Risk retention devices in insurance include deductibles, coinsurance and self-insured 
retentions.59   
 
 To appreciate how retentions function, first note that E&O insurance is written 
with limits-of-liability, meaning an express contractual limitation on the insurer’s 
responsibility to pay under a policy.  Traditional policies use a single amount to establish 
both coverage per claim as well as aggregate limits (that is, the aggregate policy amount 
is available to cover any one claim).  This is satisfactory for most small and medium-
sized auditing firms which, on average, face one claim per year for every 100 
professionals employed.60  Larger firms face more frequent annual claims and related 
                                                 
59 Under a deductible, the insured bears any loss up to a stated amount; under co-insurance, the insured 
bears a stated percentage of any loss regardless of amount. 
 
60 Goldwasser, Arnold & Eickemeyer, Accountants’ Liability (2006), supra note ___, at § 11.4 
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policies accordingly separately state limits per claim on the one hand and aggregate limits 
on the other.61   
 
 Virtually all E&O policies (with the exception of some for small firms) use 
deductibles or self-insured retentions.   Deductibles require insureds to cover losses up to 
a stated amount before the insurer is obligated to contribute; self-insured retentions 
require insureds to cover losses before the insurer is obligated to pay the full amount of 
the limits-of-liability.62 Deductibles, which are less favorable to insureds, are more 
common in traditional E&O insurance (for smaller firms) while larger firms tend to 
obtain policies using the more favorable self-insured retention terms.63 
 
 In the audit function, moral hazard can cut multiple ways.  For example, 
expansive liability presents moral hazard to shareholders ex ante.  If shareholders know 
they will be able to successfully sue an issuer’s auditor to recover losses due to audit 
failure, they enter the picture with fewer incentives to self-protect.64  This is a theoretical 
defense not only of the privity rule for auditor negligence as in Ultrameres, but also to 
support a case for limiting liability in others way, either doctrinally (as through tort law’s 
economic loss doctrine) or by fiat using damages caps.  With such public policies in 
place, investors have increased incentives both to monitor issuers (and their auditors) and 
to effectively self-insure through investment portfolio diversification. 
 
 On the other hand, such doctrinal or fiat limitations pose a different problem of 
moral hazard, increasing moral hazard among auditors on an engagement who are aware 
that their loss exposure is capped.  One issue is whose behavior is more likely to be 
influenced by such moral hazard.  This hinges, in large part, on the strength of other 
incentives that shareholders face to self-protect on the one hand and auditors have to 
avoid conduct leading to audit failure on the other.  My purpose is not to settle that issue, 
but to observe how that variable in the audit function contributes a kind of uniqueness 
compared to other tort liability and insurance contexts.65 
                                                 
61   Id.   
 
62 To illustrate the difference, consider a policy with an aggregate limits-of-liability of $2 million applicable 
to audit failure damages of $2.5 million.  With a deductible of, say $100,000, the insured must cover the 
first $100,000 and the insurer the remaining $1.9 million of policy coverage (leaving a $500,000 uninsured 
shortfall and a total obligation of $600,000); with a retention of, say also $100,000, the insured must cover 
$100,000 of the total loss, meaning the insurer pays the full $2 million limits-of-liability and the insured the 
rest, for a total of $500,000.  Id. 
 
63 Id.  
 
64 See Siliciano, Negligent Accounting, supra note ___, at 1948. 
 
65 The auditing context is not sui generis, of course, as tow examples suggest.  First, it is possible to 
conceive of the problem of auditor liability as a problem of legal error risk arising from juries or judges 
awarding excessive damages.  But this problem pervades the US liability system and is certainly not unique 
to auditing.  Absent a comprehensive systemic solution, context-specific solutions should be sought.  
Second, one might observe that purchasers of securities discount the purchase price to reflect the 
probability of financial catastrophe from audit failure (among other risks).  Yet this does not distinguish the 
securities investor class from many others, including, for example, owners of properties in areas prone to 
 22
 
 An additional complication concerns auditors’ capacity to pass insurance-related 
costs through to clients. Shifting financial risks from auditors to insurers would not 
diminish deterrence so long as auditors as a group suffered when one auditor failed.  But 
group suffering will not occur if auditors can pass insurance costs on to their clients (and, 
in turn, the public).66  Cost-passing reduces the deterrent effect of imposing the costs on 
auditors (some deterrence may remain from risk of harm to reputation).  Expanding 
auditor liability would not help much either.  Whether auditors can pass costs through is 
uncertain, although public enterprises don’t have any choice but to hire an auditor and 
choice is limited.  On the other hand, insisting that auditors retain some liability risk 
(through retentions) might incrementally frustrate their cost-passing ability (it may be 
more convincing to defend high audit fees by citing high insurance premiums than by 
citing losses incurred on liability claims).  
 
 2.  Adverse Selection — As to adverse selection, ideally, a premium should equal 
an insurer’s expected loss plus administrative costs and a fair profit.67  Yet it is rarely 
practical to calculate each insured’s individual expected loss perfectly.  The best that can 
be done (at reasonable cost) is systematic classification of each insured into groups with 
similar probabilistic attributes.  For example, in automobile insurance, insureds may be 
classified according to a combination of discrete attributes such as specific accident 
histories (called “experience rated”) and whether the vehicles they drive are equipped 
with air bags or not (called “feature rated”). 
 
 Risk classification grouping implies that, within groups, individuals pose different 
risks while paying the same premium.  As a result, more applicants will seek 
classification in lower-risk/lower-premium groups.  Resulting groups will have in them 
more relatively higher-risk than lower-risk people for that classification.  Insurers 
respond to this adverse selection by estimating its effects using increasingly-refined 
models that enable adjusting the scope of coverage and premium charged for each risk 
group classification.  These exercises are limited, however, and when the costs of 
increasing refinement are greater than the benefits, no further refinement is made.  
 
 3.  Monitoring — The monitoring-related limitations of using E&O insurance to 
address audit failure risk are serious.  First, auditor E&O insurance addresses an audit 
firm’s exposure using general policies for specific time periods.  They are not tailored to 
particular audit engagements or associated risks of audit failure. Such coverage generality 
may pose perverse incentive effects that prevent calibrating auditing tasks to the risks of 
audit failure arising from particular engagements.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
natural disaster (such as coastal areas), who also discount their purchase price in light of catastrophic risks 
too.   
 
66 See Kent D. Syverud, On the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1629, 1644-49 (1994). 
 
67 In the market imagined above, supra note ___, the insurer’s total expected loss is $1,000 and with 100 
people that means $10 each plus $5 for costs and profit. 
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 Second, and more importantly, this method separates the risk-monitoring function 
from the risk-distribution function.  That is, auditors are in control of their insured 
activities with little or no oversight by insurers. Monitoring is a way to control risk but 
when risk monitoring is separated from risk distribution, moral hazard increases.  The 
theoretical appeal of bundling monitoring and distribution evaporates to a point where 
even second-best strategies of retentions are impaired.   
 
 Put differently, the issue raises a problem of asymmetric information when 
considering the various constituents in the audit function.  Relative access to information 
is greatest among issuers, then auditors and then the latter’s external insurers.  Issuers 
have superior access to the basic financial data and are in the best position to determine 
its reliability; auditors have superior knowledge in determining their capability of 
assessing that information and thus estimating the risk of audit failure.   Insurers must 
rely upon abstract models and command data sufficient to validly estimate expected 
losses from audit failure.   
 
 Exposure from audit failure is more difficult for insurers to evaluate, as it involves 
matters of investor demographics.  Estimating the magnitude of audit failure is more 
uncertain when gauging the scope of claims is difficult (as by the number, identity or type 
of third party shareholders or other investors who may assert them).  Such informational 
asymmetry can lead insurers to increase premiums or retentions, limit coverage or add 
exclusions.  When asymmetry is acute, premium surges may occur, which increase the 
adverse selection that leads to lower-risk insureds withdrawing from pools.  With only 
high-risk insureds left, pools unravel, and self-insurance becomes the preferred route for 
the low-risk and no insurance for the high-risk. 
 
 Consider an analogy from directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance. Premiums 
and coverage may provide clues about liability risk to the extent that they are valid 
proxies for corporate governance quality.68  Yet scholars observe that D&O insurers do 
not appear to have or act upon any monitoring incentives.69 While similar data on E&O 
insurance does not appear to have been published, it is reasonable to suppose a similar 
phenomenon in this line.70 
                                                 
68 See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ 
& Officers’ Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. ___ (2007); compare Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. 
Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 IOWA J. 
CORP. L. 1, at n. 337 (2002) (premiums for D&O insurance accurately reflect governance quality (citing, at 
n. 337, John E. Core, The Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Premium: An Outside Assessment of the 
Quality of Corporate Governance, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 449 (2000)). 
 
69  See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Gatekeeper: D&O Insurers, 95 GEO. L. J. ___ (2007); 
see also Joseph A. Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in the Evolution of United States Securities 
Regulation, 8 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 7 (2002) (invoking this basis to question Professor Ronen’s 
proposal, discussed below in this Article, favoring financial statement insurance). 
 
70  A policy parallel appears: commentators who lament unavailability of auditor E&O insurance and/or 
rising liability risks dramatize their arguments by warning that the combination may drive auditors out of 
the auditing business with calamitous effects while those lamenting the unavailability of D&O insurance 
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 4.  Insurance Levers — As with all insurance products, the market for E&O 
insurance changes dynamically in response to prevailing macroeconomic and social 
conditions that have specific effects on insurance underwriting decisions.  These factors 
influence the supply of insurance available and its price (the premium) and are 
characteristically used to describe aspects of the familiar “cycle explanation” for 
insurance market dynamics.  Thus, the thumb-nail sketch of such cyclicality provided 
earlier can be explored more fully by considering underlying components of statistical 
independence, adverse selection, and moral hazard (and the bearing of monitoring 
capabilities on the latter).  In particular, consider a few examples of how retentions can 
be used to address each of these three components.  
 
 First, retentions enable insurers to neutralize correlations among risks that 
otherwise impair insurance’s efficacy to pool and distribute them (i.e., to address reduced 
independence of risks).  That is, if all pool members are certain to suffer losses of a given 
amount (say $100,000 per year), then there is no independence as to that amount.  So it is 
not susceptible to risk-pooling and distribution.  Hence, deductibles rise to that level of 
uniformly certain loss.  Likewise, if all pool members are equally highly-likely to suffer 
losses in a given category (say from secondary debt offerings of highly-leveraged 
enterprises), then the low independence of that pool would increase the appeal of internal 
retentions compared to external coverage. 
 
 Second, retentions address adverse selection by enabling insurers to distribute 
total risk more heavily to high-risk than to low-risk insureds.  This is because uniformly 
high retentions for members of a pool have the effect of charging more losses to those 
pool members that suffer claims more often or in higher amounts than other pool 
members.  High retentions are thus better for low-risk insureds than higher premiums are.  
Their existence may suggest a strategy for redressing high risk-variability in a pool and 
an effort, in response to external macro forces, to keep insurance “available.” 
 
 Third, retentions, as noted, reduce moral hazard.  In part, this arises from how 
they increase incentives for internal monitoring.  Indeed, high retentions may reflect that 
firms rather than external insurers are better able to monitor (evaluate and control) 
associated risks.  But the second-best strategy of replacing monitoring with retentions 
becomes even less effective the more unbundled the risk monitoring and risk distribution 
functions become.  This insight contributes a partial explanation for why large auditing 
firms initiated more ambitious self-insurance programs.   
 
 After all, volatility in E&O insurance markets also reflects competitive forces 
prevalent in most insurance markets, which are financial in character and therefore pose 
few structural limitations to industry expansion.71  Insurers face competition not only 
                                                                                                                                                 
amid rising liability risks do so by warning that the result may discourage talented and capable persons of 
serving on corporate boards of directors.  
 
71 See Romano, What Went Wrong , supra note ___ at 18 (noting that capacity constraints or withdraws are 
puzzles in a competitive insurance market where premiums should adjust to changing conditions but noting 
how for professional liability insurance “desired terms of coverage—and for some firms any coverage—
became unavailable, at apparently any price.”); see also id. (noting how the capacity constraint story is hard 
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from other insurers but from their customers and potential customers.  Customers who 
regularly negotiate with insurers over retentions increasingly appreciate the need to 
develop formal strategies to manage and fund related risks.  Customer responses vary 
according to different risk classification groups.  Among auditing firms, these 
classifications parallel firm size (as large, mezzanine or smaller). In recent decades, 
periods labeled “insurance crises” led the large firms to pursue more systematic programs 
of self-insurance.   
 
B.  Self-Insurance Programs (SIPs) 
 
 Hard insurance markets, and perhaps other factors, lead insureds to strategy 
options other than transferring risk, often called self-insurance.  This is a colloquial term 
that actually designates a complex variety of tools.  In general, however, self-insurance 
involves setting aside a portion of revenues from activity to meet losses should they 
occur, a strategy that became increasingly common throughout the US economy in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s.72  Of course, risk-retention devices prevalent in general 
insurance contracts, such as deductibles and co-insurance, are a partial form of self-
insurance.  What distinguishes the strategy usually described as self-insurance is a more 
comprehensive program of reserving funds to pay losses, more fully internalizing those 
risks.73   
 
 1.  Large Firm Programs — It is a commonly-stated, although stylized, fact that 
large audit firms have embarked on comprehensive self-insurance programs (SIPs), using 
their own separately-organized insurance affiliates.74  Note, however, that public details 
of such programs are scarce, as the audit firms are privately-held and do not produce the 
kinds of disclosure that public enterprises do.  Subject to this opacity, it is possible to 
assemble a composite sketch of important outlines, including operational and 
organizational scale, parameters of the programs and the types of reinsurance involved.   
 
 As to operational and organizational scale, consider, as a representative firm, 
Deloitte (formerly called Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu).  It is actually a network of some 70 
                                                                                                                                                 
to believe “Given that the input for insurance is wealth and not the physical capital of a factory which could 
have productive capacity limits”). 
 
72 See Priest, The Antitrust Suits and the Public Understanding of Insurance, supra note ___ , at ___ 
(documenting that “the extent of corporate self-insurance has increased substantially over time through the 
creation of firm or industry captive insurance subsidiaries and industry-wide mutuals.”); see also id. at ___  
(“the corporate purchase of commercial liability insurance has proven something of a puzzle because 
corporations have many potential methods of diversifying to reduce the effect of potential losses”). 
 
73 More precise vocabulary distinguishes among self-insurance, self-funding (which, in turn, assumes the 
various forms of retentions such as deductibles and co-insurance) and no insurance.  
 
74 See Talley, supra note ___ (noting “the stylized fact that, at least since the savings and loan crises of the 
late 1980s, auditing firms have been effectively self-insured, often through “captive” (i.e., wholly-owned) 
insurance companies”); Goldwasser, Arnold & Eickemeyer, Accountants’ Liability (2006), supra note ___, 
at § 11.2 (“large [auditing] firms since the mid 1980s have been unable to purchase sufficient liability 
insurance to satisfy their needs.”). 
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different member firms organized in numerous jurisdictions of the world and operating in 
149 different countries.  As a whole, Deloitte claimed total worldwide revenues for 2006 
of $20 billion and reported commanding total assets of $10 billion with total liabilities 
plus partner capital of $6.4 billion.75  Deloitte’s public materials—and its internal training 
programs—emphasize quality control throughout the organization and place a premium 
on maintaining uniform standards across those firms, evidently to promote a sense of 
single-firm identity within the network.76 
 
 The U.S. member firm of Deloitte is Deloitte USA.  It provides services through 
three main subsidiaries: Deloitte LLP, Deloitte Tax LLP and Deloitte Consulting LLP.  
These provide audit, tax, consulting and financial advisory services, respectively.  
Deloitte USA contributed $9 billion of the Deloitte annual worldwide revenue and 
employs 37,000 people (of whom 2,600 are partners; 27,000 are professional staff; and 
7,500 are administrative staff; a total of about 8,000 CPAs are among the employees).  
Deloitte USA operates through 98 US offices in 90 cities.   
 
 The other three large auditing firms present themselves in roughly similar (and 
similarly vague) ways.77  All are networks comprised of scores of separate member firms, 
all boast in the range of 100,000 employees, all generate annual revenue approaching $20 
billion, and all derive revenue from three service categories: audit, tax and 
consulting/advisory.  For each firm, about half the total revenues are from audit and 
assurance and the other half from the other activities.  Some variation appears in 
breakdowns of their respective service lines and by geographic regions of the world as 
well as by industry specialization.  Importantly, all four firms emphasize trans-network 
quality control and uniformity as part of each firm’s investments in both human capital 
and firm brand identity. 
 
                                                 
75 Deloitte Annual Report for 2006, at 51-52.  Note that these publicly-reported figures do not balance and 
that Deloitte’s public reports offer no explanation.  Perhaps the $3.6 billion difference between total assets 
of $10 billion and total liabilities plus partner capital of $6.4 billion produces a functional insurance 
reserve.  Whether formally or even informally so denominated on the firms’ private financial statements, 
some portion of the difference could be available to meet liability arising from audit failure.  The full 
amount, $3.6 billion, is considerably larger than Professor Talley’s “plausible range” of large firm viability 
thresholds estimated at between $454 million and $2.15 billion.  See Talley, supra note ___, at 1679. 
Separately, of the reported total assets, accounts receivable appeared to be the largest portion, at $4.8 
billion, with total current assets of $7.8 billion and total current liabilities of $3.6 billion (for $4.2 billion in 
working capital).  Deloitte Annual Report for 2006, at 51-52. 
 
76 See, e.g., Deloitte Annual Report for 2006, passim. 
 
77 As examples, PWC describes itself as comprised of many different firms, some large and some small.  It 
provides audit as well as non-audit and transactional services. PWC’s total worldwide revenues for 2006 
were $20 billion.  Likewise, KPMG describes itself as a “global network of professional service firms 
providing audit, tax and advisory services.”  It has a large number of “member firms” who together employ 
113,000 persons worldwide, with 6,800 partners and operations in 148 countries.  It has one member firm 
in China and one member firm in the U.S.  Total member revenues for 2006 were $16.9 billion (and in 
2005 $15.7 billion). 
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 As to the nature of the firms’ SIPs, again while the firms provide scant public 
details concerning them, the various alternative methods of self-insurance are well-
recognized.  Consider two.  In the captive form, an enterprise creates a wholly-owned 
affiliate (domestic or, more frequently, off-shore) and contributes requisite capital. The 
enterprise—and its designated component members, such as firms within a network—pay 
periodic premiums to support network-wide coverage.  The captive sometimes is 
managed using a separate management company rather than the larger enterprise’s own 
staff.   While various attributes can be created, in general, the captive thus acts as the 
enterprise’s primary insurer and usually also in turn obtains reinsurance policies to cover 
portions of its exposure.78 
 
 In the mutual form—commonly used among industrial enterprises in given 
industries—members coordinate to form what are commonly called risk-retention 
pools.79  Participants contribute premiums to the mutual and it, in turn, covers member 
losses on prescribed terms. The program often is designed using retrospectively rated 
policies, meaning that each member pays premiums initially for agreed coverage, but the 
premiums are later adjusted based on actual loss experience.80 If the member enjoys a 
favorable loss experience, a portion of its initial premium is rebated, but if it suffers an 
unfavorable loss experience, it pays an additional premium surcharge. 
 
 A SIP’s structure may be influenced by tax considerations.  To the extent that an 
enterprise allocates revenues to cover future legal liabilities in ways that impose 
substantial limitations or restrictions on access to the funds, they are not includible in US 
taxable income.81  While the exact requirements of this tax treatment are intricate82 and 
                                                 
78 A captive insurance affiliate can (a) use reinsurance or not and (b) insure only internal risks or also insure 
external risks.  Those not using reinsurance and covering only internal risks are in the exact position as the 
simple residual self-insurance created under policies containing retentions—that is, the parent (or network) 
does not transfer any risk.  Those using reinsurance and covering only internal risks do transfer risk (so 
long as the reinsurance is with reputable, liquid, solvent insurers and the premium is fixed).  See David R. 
Coburn & Stewar J. Kahn, Accounting and Auditing Aspects of Operating a Captive or Self-Insurance 
Program, in PLI, Techniques of Self-Insurance 1987 (No. A4-4206). 
 
79 Examples of mutuals include Lumberman’s Mutual, Millers Mutual and Hardware Mutual. 
 
80 According to Professor Priest, “mutuals typically provide for subsequent assessments against firm 
members based upon the liability experience of the mutual for the year.”  Priest, Public Understanding of 
Insurance, supra note ___, at 1012-13.  That is, “mutuals set premiums by making assessments to member 
firms after, rather than before, the loss experience, thus insuring for variations in loss among the firms, but 
providing self-insurance for losses common to mutual members.”  Id. 
 
81 See Dan L. Mendelson & Burton M. Mirsky, Malpractice Self-Insurance Plan Defers Income, 76 J. 
TAX’N 16 (Jan. 1992) (reporting on IRS Letter Ruling 9136005 that fees deferred under medical 
malpractice self-insurance arrangement are excludable from gross income until paid or made available 
because they are subject to substantial limitations or restrictions, including that the firm only received them 
to pay claims, on dissolution, or at a fixed date ten years later; also noting that the ruling likewise applies to 
other professionals, including accountants).  
 
82 See IRS Letter Ruling 9136005 (1991) (interpreting Reg. 1.451-2). 
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controversial as a policy matter,83 when properly designed, the benefits of self-insurance 
can make it at least as appealing as paying regular premiums to an external insurer, 
certainly at the level of periodic costs.  Using separately-organized network affiliates, 
whether captives or mutuals, can be a good way to establish the requisite restrictions on 
use of funds. 
 
 As to the terms of reinsurance that the four large auditing firms’ SIP affiliates 
obtain, once again, the firms provide little disclosure concerning these matters.  But it 
appears that these affiliates all obtain reinsurance for portions of network-wide exposure.  
These reinsurance programs probably vary slightly across the four firms, especially as to 
amounts, but again a fairly standardized picture emerges.  In general, the reinsurance 
policies resemble E&O policies in form, but appear to be more intricate, in the following 
main ways.   
 
 First, the policies contain high retentions.  The levels fluctuate over time, usually 
in tandem with insurance pricing.  For example, retentions ran to $25 million in the early 
1990s and then grew to $45 million in the mid-1990s; they dropped to $20 million by the 
end of that decade, before rising again in the 2000s.84  At present, retentions appear to 
approximate $50 million. 
 
 Second, the policies are obtained from multiple insurers covering portions of 
different layers of exposure and use high limits-of liability coverage.  As an example, a 
firm’s SIP reinsurance may provide “coverage for 85% of the layer covering $10 million 
in excess of $50 million, 90% of a layer covering $20 million in excess of $60 million, 
and 80% of the layer covering $20 million in excess of $75 million.”85   
 
 Third, while most insurance policies, including E&O insurance, are written using 
standard forms with extensive boilerplate and minimal negotiation or tailoring, policies 
for the four large auditing firms’ SIP affiliates are negotiated and tailored—usually issued 
in typewritten form, containing non-standard terms and commonly described as 
“manuscript policies.” 86   
 
 Finally, a related alternative is to use insurers not as a means to pool and 
distribute risk as traditional insurance does but as a funding source to meet losses.  Audit 
                                                 
83 See, e.g., Karen Grant, Federal Tax Treatment of Medical Malpractice Insurance Alternatives for 
Nonprofits, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 495 (2004). 
 
84 Id. Goldwasser, Arnold & Eickemeyer, Accountants’ Liability (2006), supra note ___, at § 11.2.   
 
85 Id.  For example, assuming a $100 million covered loss, the firm pays a total of $57.5 million and 
insurers pay $42.5 million: [.85 (60 - 50)] + [.90 (80 – 60)] + [.80 (95 -75)] = 8.5 + 18 + 16 = $42.5.  
Assuming no other external coverage, for settlements greater than that, the firm pays 100% of the excess.   
 
86  Id.  Manuscript policies are not common in primary insurance underwriting but are more the norm in 
reinsurance underwriting, where the term “facultative” is also used (referring to the reinsurer’s “faculty” to 
accept or deny risks) and in the programs that reinsurers use to reinsure their exposure, where the term 
recessory is also used. 
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firm SIP affiliates appear to execute financing agreements with their reinsurers.  These 
provide that the latter will fund losses on designated terms but require the firm to repay 
those funds in full.87 
 
 2.  Decisions to Self-Insure — A decision to self-insure or use external insurance 
(with some self-funding) can be influenced by many factors, but ultimately must be based 
on a comparative cost-benefit analysis.  The threshold element in the decision is whether 
the risk is calculable.  An important requirement is that an enterprise operates using a 
sufficient population of “homogenous exposure units . . . to allow an actuarially sound 
calculation of risk.”88  For auditing firms, such units could include, for example, total 
personnel, total professional personnel or total audit engagements.  
 
 So armed, the comparative set of costs are principally (a) the costs of obtaining 
insurance, chiefly premiums (which, in turn, are comprised of insurer costs, surpluses and 
profits) plus brokers’ or agents’ commissions versus (b) administrative costs of a program 
(operations and maintenance, claims handling, and litigation).  Quantifying the 
comparison in abstract terms is impossible because too many variables are involved.  
Indeed, comparative benefits are difficult even to state, as they range from internal loss 
control capability and claims administration efficiency to external dynamics of litigation 
and the power to manage it. 
 
 Nevertheless, simply viewing the question from a comparative cost-benefit 
perspective suggests that characterizations such as whether a risk is “insurable” or 
“uninsurable” can be imprecise.  For example, it may be superficial to say that self-
insurance arose among the four large auditing firms because insurers regard the risk as 
“too high” or “too unpredictable.”  It can likewise appear facile to opine that such 
conclusions are due to expansion of legal liability that auditors face.  Indeed, that claim is 
somewhat counterfactual in the current period, given how the PSLRA, SLUSA and 
Central Bank all reduced such exposure and how empirical data show a decline in the 
frequency of suits against auditors.89 
 
 True, as noted, factors that affect the comparative cost-benefit analysis vary with 
the circumstances creating hard external insurance markets, which can include both legal 
uncertainty and legal liability risks.  Yet, those circumstances of the macro-environment 
are influenced, more fundamentally, by micro factors, and these provide a more concrete 
analytical basis for exploring the comparative calculus than conclusions about whether 
risks are insurable or not.   
 
                                                 
87 Id. 
 
88 Ken Brownlee, Defending the ‘Self-Insured’ or ‘Self-Funded’ Entity, 22 No. 15 INS. LITIG. REP. 465 
(Sept. 1, 2000). 
 
89 See supra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
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 The question is whether it is more efficient (or cost-effective) for a party to obtain 
external insurance or create self-insurance.90  The answer depends on whether the party 
or an external insurer is better positioned to monitor and distribute (pool) the risk.  Since 
firms and insurers have some capacity to diversify risks, the issue is ultimately which has 
the superior ability to do so.  That hinges, in turn and in general, on risk independence, 
adverse selection, moral hazard and monitoring capability.  Consider each point. 
 
 As to risk independence, for insurance to be appealingly-priced, risks that 
insureds within a pool face cannot be too highly correlated.  There must be sufficient 
statistical independence for an insurer to make valid predictions that the aggregate 
premium and investment income from the pool will be sufficient to fund reserves to meet 
loss payouts, including covering administrative costs and providing a profit.  If requisite 
insurer reserves equal or exceed those that a self-insuring firm would require, it is more 
effective for a firm to self-insure.  
 
 If the four large auditing firms operate SIPs akin to the mutual form used by 
industrial enterprises, this could reflect decreased risk independence over time (which 
may be due to many factors, including legal liability or to increasing uniformity in audit 
quality achieved by increasing homogeneity among the large firms).  Mutuals may be 
better than external insurers at furnishing coverage for any loss category in which there is 
substantial correlation among members.  The external insurer’s solution to the challenge 
would be to offer coverage for some group losses but with exclusions for the highly-
correlated type.  Yet defining the highly-correlated type contractually can be difficult and 
the difficulty may make external insurers a less effective discriminator compared to how 
the mutual approach can enable members to pool individual member risks (of all sorts) 
while also covering all group losses. 
 
 As to adverse selection, it can be exacerbated when there is an acutely wide 
disparity of risk profiles in a single insurance pool.  At an extreme, no insurer can sustain 
such pools and too few low-risk insureds will remain in them so that the pool can unravel 
and the market for that insurance disappear.  To say that the risk is “uninsurable,” 
however, remains imprecise.  It means that insureds who are otherwise candidates for that 
pool will not participate in it because they are better off meeting the risk by other means.  
Of course, the word “uninsurable” may be apt to the extent that the absence of low-risk 
insureds means that insurers will not make the insurance available to high-risk insureds. 
 
 Acute adverse selection arising from highly-disparate risks means that there is so 
much variation among pool members or candidates that insurers cannot effectively 
segregate low-risk from high-risk members and thus offer equivalent insurance terms (as 
to premiums, retentions and exclusions/coverage (limits-of-liability)).  When that occurs, 
lower-risk members will not participate because what they pay and receive is worth less 
than the risk that they would contribute to the pool.  At the extreme, that could mean that 
                                                 
90 See Priest, The Public Understanding of Insurance, supra note ___, at ___ (making this point and 
furnishing the analytical architecture upon which the following evaluations are based). 
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the particular insurance product is unavailable to anyone and to that extent the related 
risks may be described as “uninsurable.” 
 
 As to moral hazard and monitoring, self-insurance bundles risk-monitoring and 
risk-distribution functions, as noted.  Whereas E&O insurance separates risk-monitoring 
from risk-distribution, self-insurance combines the two.  Risk-monitoring is performed by 
the same enterprise that distributes the risk.  Within the networks that constitute each of 
the four large auditing firms, members may eliminate the costs of moral hazard (and 
adverse selection).  At minimum, the network character of the firms enables internal 
monitoring in ways that external insurers cannot replicate.  This appears particularly 
likely given how each of the four large firms devotes considerable resources to promoting 
uniform internal quality-control programs. 
 
 All or some combination of the foregoing factors likely have played some role in 
the decisions that the four large auditing firms have made to engage in substantial self-
insurance programs.91  No firm would have opted for a self-insurance program unless it 
had determined that the costs of supporting it are less than premiums (and commissions) 
required to buy equivalent external insurance.  This determination is based on either 
knowledge or belief that the risk it would otherwise contribute to an external insurance 
pool (for a given price) is less than the risk it actually brings to that pool (the price should 
be lower).  The self-insuring firm determines, in other words, that it can bear the risk 
more cost-effectively than paying the price an external insurer charges to pool that risk 
for it.   
 
 Two additional factors may help to explain the rise and persistence of SIPs among 
the four large auditing firms, as well as why the medium and smaller firms have not 
tended to opt for such ambitious programs.  The first is a path dependence story.  Once 
induced to adopt SIPs due to macro-events plus the scale that makes them possible, with 
a formal program established, it may be more cost-effective to sustain it permanently than 
allow it to fluctuate according to the relative supply and pricing of E&O insurance. 
 
 The second is a wealth story.  Risk aversion can vary with the net worth of a 
decision-maker, with those having fewer resources being more risk averse and those 
commanding considerable resources being less risk averse.92  It is possible that smaller 
public accounting firms are more risk averse than the four large firms.  If so, this also 
                                                 
91 See Romano, What Went Wrong, supra note ___ at 27:  
 
[discussing directors’ and officers’ insurance and noting that issuers are] often better 
informed about [novel litigation] risks and some of these risks are within the insured’s 
control.  This situation may be one of the reasons for the rise in policyholder-formed 
insurers: the adverse selection and moral hazard problems created by the information 
asymmetry between insured and insurer will obviously be remedied if the insured 
becomes the insurer. It is plausible, in this context, to anticipate that policyholder-formed 
insurance groups could screen members more effectively than commercial insurers. 
 
92 See supra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
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would explain why they show a stronger appetite for self-insurance compared to smaller 
firms.  Put differently, the larger firms may be more willing to take chances than smaller 
ones.93 
 
 This analysis does not negate the possibility that expanded legal liability may 
explain the rise of SIPs among the four large auditing firms—or that legal uncertainty and 
associated catastrophic risk may continue to play a role in their continued use.94   Indeed, 
this is a common theory of the rise of self-insurance programs throughout the US 
economy in recent decades. 95  For example, for corporations generally, expanded tort 
liability increases risk variability by shifting the burden of losses from first to third 
parties (from violators to insurers), thus encouraging adverse selection (meaning high-
risk insureds seek out pools containing low-risk insureds).  It also reduces risk 
independence because tort-expanding laws are or can be systemic rather than discrete, 
putting all pool members or candidates at increasingly uniform levels of risk.96   
 
 This account appears to be plausible both for many industries generally and 
possibly for auditing in particular.  Consider, for example, the empirical frequency and 
magnitude of securities fraud class action claims against auditing firms.  Their statistical 
distribution exhibits greater density in the right tail than under a normal distribution, 
meaning there are a larger number of larger risks.97  Such fat-tail distributions present an 
exception to basic principles of risk distribution through diversification that support 
establishing insurance pools.  While basic theory prescribes diversifying risk away by 
adding to a portfolio, for fat-tail distributions the opposite obtains (not to diversify) as 
each additional investment increases risk.  If this occurs in the large audit firm insurance 
market, it could explain insurer reluctance to provide E&O insurance and the rise of SIPs 
among large auditing firms.  
 
 Yet this general critique as applied to auditing may insufficiently account for 
matters of adverse selection, moral hazard and monitoring in the audit function.98  
                                                 
93 Yet another possibility is firms’ relative ability to pass through insurance-related costs to clients, but it is 
difficult to see how the costs of external versus internal insurance would be easier or harder to transfer that 
way.  
 
94 See supra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
 
95 See Priest, The Public Understanding of Insurance, supra note ___, text a n. 39 (attributing variability 
increase and independence decrease to the “obvious explanation” that “In the mid-1960s, courts began to 
expand tort liability for corporate activities, both by extending affirmative duties and restricting available 
defenses.”). 
 
96  See also Romano, What Went Wrong, supra note ___ at 15 (if all insureds are equally affected by new 
developments, including uncertainties arising from legal change, “the increased liability risks will not be 
independent. A dependency in insureds’ losses disrupts insurance markets because the law of large 
numbers will no longer apply for pricing risks, so that premiums will be greater than expected losses.”).    
 
97 See Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk, supra note ___, at 1645-46. 
 
98 It also may discount the significance of investment diversification that investors can pursue. See 
Romano, What Went Wrong, supra note ___ at 15 (citing Ralph K. Winter, “Crises” in Competitive 
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Consider alternative interpretations of the data that do so.  Moral hazard and adverse 
selection can lead to premiums greater than insureds are willing to pay.  That is, an 
insurer may determine, under adverse selection, that policies would underwrite industry 
“lemons.”  That could lead them to price policies so high that the non-lemon insureds opt 
out of the pool.  The non-lemons are those insureds capable and willing to engage in 
sufficient risk monitoring on their own to reduce the probability of loss and its magnitude 
should it occur.   
 
 Among the large auditing firms, this would mean that they have simply become 
the lower cost avoider compared to external insurers.99  Accordingly, while liability and 
catastrophic risk may partially explain the rise of SIPs and decline of attractively priced 
E&O insurance, these basic components of insurance analysis—and the effects of scale 
that the SIP affiliates command—contribute at least equally important explanations.100 
 
 This tentative conclusion is reinforced by an analytical view of the strategies 
available to insurers seeking to provide insurance at prices that customers find appealing.  
In theory, the pool premium on every insurance pool should be measured according to the 
pool’s average risk.101  If so, the pool premium exceeds the risk that low-risk members 
contribute.  When risk variability increases, that gap increases (low-risk insureds pay 
even more than the risk they contribute).  Low-risk insureds are thus the marginal buyers 
and insurers compete to obtain their business.  Competition may include refining pool 
categories and putting channeling customers into lower-risk pools with lower premiums 
or better terms, which insurers attempt to do by more accurate risk-segregation and 
discrimination methods.  
 
 To work, the strategy requires insurer ability to conduct sufficient monitoring of 
their customers.  For that to be cost effective, in turn, the cost of refining the 
classifications must be less than the gains from attracting targeted business.  But high 
risk-variability pools limit an insurer’s ability to compete effectively in this way and 
discourage low-risk customers from buying offered policies.  Monitoring is central to this 
exercise and this supports the view that the capacity of SIPs to combine risk monitoring 
with risk distribution renders them a potentially superior model of insuring audit failure 
                                                                                                                                                 
Insurance Markets, Hoover Inst. of Stan. U. Working Papers in Econ., No. E-86-74, at 4 (Dec. 1986) as 
“arguing dependent risks, that is, nondiversifiability in the insurance market, should not matter in a stock 
market economy because insurers could diversify those risks in the capital market”). 
 
99 See Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk, supra note ___, at 1646.  In this view, auditors can “more 
efficiently internalize agency costs [i.e., of both adverse selection and moral hazard] by self-insuring.”  Id.  
They also can address their overall risk profile because they have “the ability to raise fees in the face of 
litigation risk [and this] permits auditing firms to engage in a form of effective self-insurance, extracting 
actuarial payments that reflect downstream liability risk.”  Id. 
 
100 See Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk, supra note ___, at 1646 (“While [catastrophic] risk exposure 
may well be playing a partial role, it is plausible that scale economies and agency costs also help explain 
the absence of an insurance market for dominant auditing firms.”). 
 
101 Priest, The Public Understanding of Insurance, supra note ___. 
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than E&O insurance.  While still not conclusive, it casts analytical doubt upon the 
persuasiveness of insurance-based arguments favoring damages caps on auditor liability.  
Even if incorrect, it seems premature to accept the argument without considering 
potential models of insuring audit failure yet untried.   
 
III.   POTENTIAL INSURANCE FOR AUDIT FAILURE 
 
 While E&O insurance and self-insurance programs are the extant models to 
address liability for audit failure, two alternatives deserve further exploration as a matter 
of public policy: financial statement insurance and insurance-based securitization. 
Previous proposals concerning financial statement insurance are summarized briefly 
before presenting the novel alternative of adapting insurance-based securitization to 
address catastrophic audit failure risk. 
 
A.  Financial Statement Insurance (FSI) 
 
 Financial statement insurance (FSI), was introduced by New York University 
Accounting Professor Joshua Ronen102 and I have elaborated upon it in a series of 
articles.103  While not yet in place on a large scale for public companies, embryonic 
versions of FSI are used in private market merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions 
and analogues are in use in other contexts.  This vehicle offers numerous attractions, 
including not only a way to establish functional caps on auditor liability and address 
relatively ordinary risks of audit failure, but several other benefits of transparency and 
monitoring compared to existing practice.    
 
 1.  Structure — FSI’s basic idea is simple.  In M&A transactions, a seller 
represents that its financial statements fairly present financial condition and results in 
conformity with GAAP; an insurer engages an auditor to review the statements and backs 
the representation with insurance.104  Should the seller breach that representation—
equivalent to audit failure—the insured pays losses up to the contractually agreed upon 
amount.105 
                                                 
102  Ronen, Post-Enron Reform:  Financial Statement Insurance and GAAP Revisited, supra note ___, at 
48-60. 
 
103 Cunningham, Too Big to Fail, supra note ___; Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers, supra note ___; 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Model Financial Statement Insurance Act, 11 CONN. INS. L. J. 69 (2004). 
 
104 See Darian M. Ibrahim, The Unique Benefits of Treating Personal Goodwill as Property in Corporate 
Acquisitions, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 41-42 (2005); DALE A. OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS 289 (2nd ed. 2002). 
 
105 Analogous insurance products are used to cover both tax opinions and ERISA compliance, in each case 
involving a lawyer or other expert investigating and providing formal opinions that are then backed by 
insurance.  See Kenneth A. Gary, New Opportunity for Tax Lawyers:  Insuring Tax Transactions, 104 TAX 
NOTES 26 (2004) (proliferation of tax insurance); Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax 
Insurance, 25 VA. TAX L. REV. 339 (2005) (tax insurance in context of characteristics of tax code); Jeffrey 
D. Mamorsky & Terry L. Moore, Greenberg Traurig LLP, Fiduciary Audit Insurance: Risk Management 
for Post-Enron ERISA Compliance, GT Alert, June 2002, at 4, available at 
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 To put FSI to work on the broad scale necessary for public companies and their 
auditors, several somewhat radical structural changes would occur.  Rather than an issuer 
engaging an auditor whose liability risks are backed by E&O insurance or self-insurance, 
issuers buy insurance directly from an insurer.  The insurance policy covers a given set of 
financial statements in exchange for a premium, which the insurer sets, in part, based on a 
preliminary audit of the issuer using an auditor that the insurer hires.  A final audit is 
performed before the policy is issued and coverage is established for those financial 
statements.  If losses occur, the insurer pays covered losses, in accordance with the 
policy’s limits of liability.  Benefits of this structure include removing the inherent 
conflict of interest that arises when issuers hire and pay auditors to give opinions on their 
financial statements.  
 
 In addition to these changes to structural features, the proposed FSI regime calls 
for issuers to disclose publicly the premium they are charged and the amount of related 
coverage they obtain (including any details as to deductibles, exclusions and so on).  This 
disclosure is designed to provide public information concerning financial statement 
reliability.  Investors and analysts would be able to calculate statistically-valid 
comparisons of relative financial statement integrity among issuers. Thus in addition to 
eliminating conflict-of-interest embedded in the traditional audit function, new 
transparency arises that is lacking in the current regime in which auditors issue the 
identical three-paragraph opinion for the financial statements of enterprises having vastly 
different (and individually unique) accounting circumstances. 
 
 2.  Advantages — Beyond these attractions of FSI compared to traditional 
practice, FSI has implications for insurance analysis that reveal additional advantages.  
As to moral hazard, FSI can potentially eliminate it.  FSI moves auditors into the liability 
background. Auditors become insurer employees, and subject to supervision, 
compensation and termination by them.  Thus auditors no longer face any insurance-
based decisions that are prone to creating moral hazard.  FSI also essentially eliminates 
the traditional concerns of adverse selection.  It does so because it is an entirely different 
product compared to traditional categories of insurance such as professional liability 
insurance (or casualty or property insurance).  Rather, among insurance products, FSI is 
akin to title insurance, an otherwise sui genersis insurance line.   
 
 Title insurance is coverage concerning risks of defects in legal title to real 
property.  Home sellers represent ownership of title to buyers and, when transferring their 
interest, provide buyers title insurance policies supporting the representation.  If the seller 
breaches the representation, the insurer defends the buyer’s claim of title against third 
parties and pays the buyer’s damages arising from the third party’s successful assertion 
against the buyer’s title.   Title insurance is retroactive in character in the sense that it 
covers matters arising before the policy issuance date.  
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eligibility). 
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 Analogously, FSI insures a particular year’s financial statements, with coverage 
extending to discoveries made in future periods.  FSI covers accounting irregularities 
reflected in financial statements of a prior period.  FSI and title insurance both solve a 
problem of incomplete information: with title insurance, the quality of a seller’s title, and 
with FSI, the quality of a company’s financial statements.  In contrast, E&O insurance is 
less about incomplete information than about behavioral and performance risks. While 
the costs of adverse selection can be considerable in underwriting E&O insurance, the 
cost essentially disappears under FSI. 
 
 As to monitoring, FSI contributes superior results compared to E&O insurance—
and a different form of monitoring compared to SIPs.  Unlike most insurance lines, 
including E&O insurance, a substantial portion of premiums received on title insurance 
policies are used to fund investigation rather than payouts, administrative costs and 
profits.106  Title insurers engage (and FSI insurers would engage) risk-assessment using 
particularized investigations concerning the specific attributes of an insured matter 
(property and zoning records for title insurance and specific financial statements for 
FSI).107   
 
 As a result, FSI amounts to a bundling of the monitoring and risk distribution 
functions into the insurers.  Of course, SIPs likewise bundle the two, although they 
bundle them inward within the audit firm or network instead of outward to the insurer.  In 
contrast, as noted, E&O insurance separates the two functions.  Consequently, E&O 
insurance may not produce optimal insurer investigation.   
 
 FSI provides monitoring incentives on insurers that differ from those insurers face 
when underwriting E&O insurance.   E&O policies provide general coverage for a broad 
range of activities, including all audit engagements plus tax and other consulting services.  
The same is essentially true for the SIPs that the large auditing firms use.  In contrast, 
each FSI is tailored to a particular audit engagement with associated risk, premium, and 
coverage.  Audit effectiveness and auditor performance bear directly on financial 
statement and reporting quality.  Under FSI, auditor review and opinions are imminent 
monitoring functions—they are the essence of the concept.   
 
 As noted, SIPs and FSI thus both bundle monitoring and risk distribution, but into 
different locations.  With SIPs, the monitoring and risk functions are bundled within the 
audit firm (bundled-in) whereas with FSI the functions are bundled out to the insurer 
(bundled-out).  Which is better is a function of which bundling more nearly optimizes 
between being least costly and most effective.  This is an empirical question for which no 
data exist, of course.  An analytical case could be to favor one or the other but such an 
assessment is likely to produce a draw.  That is, for the audit function, the idea of 
                                                 
106  See JAMES L. GOSDIN, TITLE INSURANCE: A COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW 2 (2d ed. 2000) (“a substantial 
part of title insurance cost generally [is] allocated to search, evaluation/examination, or clearing 
underwriting objections”); id. at 4 ( for title insurance, losses and legal costs range as low as 3% to 7% of 
total operating income). 
 
107   Id., at 1. 
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bundling may likely be superior to separation, but there is no a priori reason to conclude 
that the two are better bundled-in or bundled-out.  
 
 Assuming a draw on the relative merits of bundling-in or bundling-out, the case 
still may be made to favor one or the other for separate reasons.  Appealing about SIPs is 
conservatism—it is the status quo and requires no changes, political or otherwise.  
Appealing about FSI are (1) severing the longstanding conflict-of-interest that bedevils 
the audit function when issuers pay those who opine on their financial statements and (2) 
the unprecedented production of a financial statement reliability index. 
 
 FSI could produce another advantage by using option markets as functional 
reinsurance.  Investors would write and sell put options to FSI insurers respecting stock 
of covered companies.108  Puts would give insurers the right to sell covered stock to 
investors during a stated period upon the occurrence of stated events at a stated exercise 
price.  Duration and triggering events would be co-extensive with the FSI policy period 
and triggering events (essentially, audit failure).  Investors would sell the puts for a price 
less than the price of general options on the same stock (i.e., those whose exercise is not 
conditional on audit failure) and that price would essentially represent a reinsurance 
premium from the insurer’s viewpoint.  Upon a triggering event, stock price likely would 
fall below the exercise price, enticing the insurer to exercise the option and establishing 
functional re-insurance.  Investors writing numerous puts on a large number of stocks 
enable designing a diversified portfolio of FSI puts.  
 
 Also appealing is how the installation of the insurance industry into the forefront 
of the financial reporting system increases significantly the number of competitors to this 
marketplace.  With SIPs, there are only four firms capable of auditing the vast majority of 
public enterprises.  This poses considerable systemic risk should any audit failure 
threaten the viability of any one of them (and this, in turn, creates significant moral 
hazard among auditors who may behave as if their firms are too big to fail).   FSI has 
comparative appeal because dozens of insurers are capable of underwriting it. 
 
 This conclusion need not rule out the possibility of sustaining SIPs, however.  FSI 
and SIPs both can be used—they are not mutually exclusive.  Audit firms can continue 
operating SIPs but also embark on an FSI regime by holding out their SIPs among those 
FSI insurers competing for issuer audit insurance work.  So, for example, Procter & 
Gamble could hire Chubb to write FSI for it and Chubb can in turn hire Deloitte’s 
auditing arm to provide the investigation.  Alternatively, Procter & Gamble could hire 
Deloitte’s SIP affiliate to write FSI and have it, in turn, engage Deloitte’s auditing arm to 
provide the assurance.109  
                                                 
108 See Ronen, supra note ___, at 16-17.   
 
109 Inviting auditing firms to use their SIP affiliates to underwrite FSI raises a question concerning whether 
this would mean that the firms thus engage in “the business of insurance.”  If so, state insurance regulations 
could apply to limit the efficacy of this alternative.  On the other hand, a similar question could be raised 
concerning the firms’ existing SIP programs and, in both SIPs and FSI, good arguments suggest that the 
auditing firms’ role should not be considered to be the business of insurance within the meaning of those 
regulations. 
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 Financial statement insurance can provide a mechanism to establish the functional 
equivalent of a damages cap for audit failure.  The cap does not directly apply to auditors, 
of course, for they face no liability to investors (they may face contractual and other 
liability for transgressions to their insurer employers).  The cap is established through the 
policy terms reached between issuers and insurers which, in turn, would be disclosed to 
public capital markets ex ante and enable investors to make capital allocation decisions 
accordingly (based on measurable resources available in the event of audit failure and the 
transparent financial statement reliability index).  To this extent, FSI furnishes support for 
quotidian cases of audit failure well but perhaps not catastrophic cases.  Insurance-based 
securitization can address the latter. 
 
B.  Insurance-Based Securitization (IBS) 
 
 Insurance-based securitization is a novel innovation that would distribute risk of 
audit failure through capital markets and specifically addresses concerns about 
catastrophic risks.  Securitization refers to the practice of packaging into securities some 
underlying set of economic attributes, usually cash flows and related risks.  It is a 
decades-old practice that began when mortgage lenders pooled loans that they had written 
into grantor trusts which then issued securities to the public backed by cash flows on 
those loans and subject to borrower default risk.   
 
 A proliferation of pooled assets ensued, encompassing automobile and boat loans, 
credit card receivables, and projected cash flows from computer leases and popular 
musical recording contracts.  In credit card deals, for example, a bank generates credit 
card receivables and faces related consumer default risk while tying up its cash.  In a 
securitization, it transfers the latter burdens by selling the receivables to a grantor trust 
(or other special purpose entity or SPE) for cash supplied by investors.  Investors, in turn, 
enjoy a return on investment in accordance with that default risk—which, for portions of 
the capital markets, increases financial diversification.  By isolating the assets in the SPE, 
moreover, investors look solely to the credit risk of the pool, not to that of the originating 
bank.   
 
 The basic insight underlying asset-backed securities motivates insurance-based 
securitization (IBS), although they involve different sides of the balance sheet.  Whereas 
asset-backed securitization involves the transfer of assets to an SPE, insurance-based 
securitization involves essentially the transfer of liabilities to an SPE.  That is, the SPE 
attracts investors who are willing to take a risk that designated insured risks will 
materialize, which reduces or eliminates the principal they are owed, in exchange for a 
relatively high interest rate to compensate for that risk (along with the possibility that the 
full principal will be repaid). 
 
 Since the mid-1990s, insurance based-securitization has become increasingly used 
by insurers—and several non-insurance businesses—to protect against exposure to 
catastrophic risks for which traditional insurance (or reinsurance) is either unavailable or 
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comparatively expensive.  Following this innovation, auditing firms concerned about the 
catastrophic risk that a massive audit failure could wreak—the dissolution of one of the 
four remaining firms—should find insurance-based securitization attractive.   
 
 1.  The Market — In the mid-1990s, following the natural catastrophes of 
Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge, California earthquake, insurance capacity to cover 
catastrophic risks contracted significantly.110  This led innovators to adapt securitization 
to fill the gap.111  Resulting products are sometimes collectively called “risk-linked 
securities.”  The most common of these are called catastrophe bonds (nicknamed cat 
bonds),112 because the risks they address have historically been called catastrophe risks 
(some are called super catastrophic risks).  These are low-probability, high-magnitude 
events, commonly illustrated by natural disasters like hurricanes, earthquakes and 
tornados, but including man-made events such as terrorist attacks and financial 
calamities.113   
 
 In a basic “cat-bond” deal structure, an investment bank or insurance company 
creates a special purpose entity (SPE).  The SPE is usually located offshore, mainly to 
avoid adverse US income tax consequences.  The SPE issues bonds in a private 
placement to qualified institutional investors.  The bonds usually carry a floating interest 
rate with a significant spread above LIBOR (the London Interbank Offered Rate, the rate 
that large international banks charge each other for sizable loans). 
 
 Cash flows into the SPE from three sources: insurance premiums from the insurer 
(or reinsurer), the principal investment of investors and investment income on its funds 
                                                 
110 In August 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck south of Miami, Florida, resulting in property damage of 
some $30 billion, of which half was insured. Insurers were riveted, with 11 firms bankrupted.  In January 
1994, an earthquake rocked northwest of Los Angeles in the Northridge area of the San Fernando Valley, 
also producing about $30 billion in damages of which nearly half was insured. Earthquake insurance 
availability declined dramatically as a result.  US GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS: 
THE ROLE OF RISK-LINKED SECURITIES AND FACTORS AFFECTING THEIR USE 11 (Sept. 2002) (citing report 
by Swiss Reinsurance Company for 2000) [hereinafter, GAO, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS]. 
 
111 Innovators include insurers as well as non-insurance businesses.  Nothing about IBS limits its creation to 
insurers or reinsurers.  See GAO, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS, supra note ___, at 18 (“A noninsurance 
business that has catastrophe exposure can also sponsor catastrophe bonds through a similar entity, a 
special purpose vehicle.”).  Indeed, as noted below, at least two IBS transactions have been closed by non-
insurance enterprises.  
 
112 The Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) experimented with catastrophe options in the late 1990s, the first 
systematic effort to market risk-linked securities. Introduced in 1995, contracts covered insurer’s risk 
exposure based on various regional indexes.  CBOT ceased offering catastrophe options in 1999 due to 
weak demand for the products.  See GAO, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS, supra note ___, at 18. 
 
113 Just as E&O and other insurance markets are cyclical, supra text accompanying notes ___-___, 
catastrophe reinsurance markets are cyclical too.  See GAO, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS, supra note 
___, at 14.  In addition, occurrences in one catastrophic context (such as hurricanes) can lead to 
contractions in other (non-hurricane) catastrophe markets. See Kenneth A. Froot & Paul G. J. O’Connell, 
The Pricing of U.S. Catastrophe Reinsurance, in KENNETH A. FROOT, ED., THE FINANCING OF 
CATASTROPHE RISK (1999). 
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(these are usually fixed rate returns which are then swapped with a creditworthy 
counterparty who pays LIBOR-based floating rates for on-payment to investors).  Cash 
flows out of the SPE in the form of periodic interest to investors along with a return of 
principal at the end of its term. 
 
 During the term, the SPE holds funds in trust and invests them in designated 
classes of securities (usually US government bonds or other high-grade securities).  If the 
catastrophe does not occur, the SPE returns principal to the investors and terminates its 
existence; but if the catastrophe occurs, principal that otherwise would be paid to 
investors is instead paid to the sponsor.  It is conceptually—if not mechanically or 
technically—akin to the risk of corporate insolvency that investors in traditional 
corporate bonds face. 
 
 The IBS market is young and thin, but has steadily expanded.  The first IBS 
transaction closed in 1995 and involved $84 million of coverage; in 1998, 18 deals were 
closed involving a total of $2.5 billion;114 from 1999 through 2004, some 50 additional 
transactions were closed, most by insurers, and averaging about $100 million each.115  In 
1999, Oriental Land Company became the first non-insurer to issue a catastrophe bond116 
and, in 2002, the Hollywood-based movie company, Vivendi International, closed an IBS 
transaction with coverage of up to $175 million for losses arising from earthquakes in 
Southern California.117  While most estimates indicate that the IBS market is not 
inconsiderable,118 it remains a small share of the overall reinsurance market—less than 
half of a percent according to one estimate.119  
 
                                                 
114 See Tamar Frankel & Joseph W. LaPlume, Securitizing Insurance Risks, 19 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 203, 
225 (2000) (citing Alex Maurice, NAIC Poised to Adopt Securitization Models, NAT’L UNDERWRITER, 
PROP. & CASUALTY RISK & BENEFITS MGMT. ED., July 12, 1999, at § 28)); see also ROBERT JERRY, 
UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 1062 (3d ed. 2002) (noting that, through 2000, some $4 billion of 
insurance-based securities were issued); Investors Guar. Fund, Ltd. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 50 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1523 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1998) (discussing early history of IBS market). 
 
115 See MMC SECURITIES, THE GROWING APPETITE FOR CATASTROPHIC RISK: THE CATASTROPHIC BOND 
MARKET AT YEAR END 2004 32-35 (2005).  
 
116 See Frankel & LaPlume, supra note ___, at 225 (citing J. David Cummins, The Insurance Link To 
Securities, RISK MGMT., Aug. 1, 1999, at 17). 
 
117 See MMC SECURITIES, THE GROWING APPETITE FOR CATASTROPHIC RISK, supra note ___, at 32-35. 
 
118 For an estimate that seems very high compared to others, see Martha G. Bannerman, Avoiding and 
Resolving Reinsurance Coverage Disputes: A Proactive Approach, PLI REINSURANCE VOLUME 173, 203-
04 (PLI 1998) (putting the IBS market in 1998 at $200 billion). 
 
119 See GAO, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS, supra note ___, at 17 (according to estimates provided by 
Swiss Re and Goldman Sachs, some $12 billion of IBS were issued from 1996 to 2002 through about 70 
transactions).  For perspective, the size of the US capital markets in 2002 approximated $31 trillion.  Id.   
For further perspective, at that time, approximately $2 trillion in asset-backed securities were outstanding.  
Id. at 19. 
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 2.  Structuring Challenges — Despite steady growth in the IBS market, several 
complexities associated with many of the transactions—especially those initiated by 
insurers—help to explain why it will take time for the market to blossom fully.  While all 
these complexities have been overcome for insurers wishing to sponsor deals, if slowly, 
they are essentially either non-existent for auditing firms and their SIP affiliates or have 
been sufficiently plowed in previous transactions so that the road is substantially paved 
for auditing firms to close IBS transactions.  This is especially likely that Oriental Land 
Company and Vivendi International, both non-insurers, successfully did so.  Consider 
each of the hurdles, how the industry has met them so far, and how much easier it would 
be for auditing firms to follow suit. 
 
 First, as a preliminary matter, transaction costs can be high.  These include the 
costs of securities underwriting, legal advice, accounting support, risk evaluation, rating 
agency assessments and communicating information to investors.  These costs 
accompany any securities offering, of course, but can be higher for IBS transactions than 
traditional corporate bond or equity offerings and even higher compared to conventional 
asset-backed securitizations.  For auditing firms, however, the real question is comparing 
the costs of IBS to the costs associated with retaining the catastrophic risk through self-
insurance programs or laying-off portions through reinsurance arrangements.  To the 
extent that the claimed inability or expense of doing either is exorbitant, the costs of 
arranging an IBS deal should make it cost-effective.120   
 
 Second, taxation matters.  To be cost-effective, the SPE must enjoy “pass-
through” tax treatment.121  That is, if the SPE were taxed on its income (from premiums 
received and from investments) and investors were likewise taxed on their investment 
income, the double tax would render many SPE transactions non-cost-effective. At 
present, transactions using SPEs based in the US result in such double-taxation.  True, the 
bonds could be offered only to tax-exempt investors but that is only a partial solution.   
Better is to locate the SPE outside the US—and have no other connections with the US—
to avoid US entity-level income taxes.122  Many jurisdictions offer such pass-through 
treatment, including Bermuda and Cayman Islands, and most IBS SPEs are located in 
those places.123 This should present no problem to the auditing firms—they can simply 
locate an SPE in the same off-shore jurisdiction that their SIP affiliates are located.  
 
                                                 
120  Id. at 4.  Obviously, the comparison is between transaction costs like these plus interest costs compared 
to reinsurance and self-insurance costs, as noted infra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
 
121 Id., at 12. 
 
122  The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has lobbied to pass legislation that 
would offer tax approaches to IBS akin to that enacted for Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits 
(REMICs) and Financial Asset Securitization Investment Trusts (FASITs).  GAO, CATASTROPHE 
INSURANCE RISKS, supra note ___, at ___. 
 
123 GAO, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS, supra note ___, at 26. 
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 Third, US GAAP imposes special accounting rules for SPEs.  The principal ones 
are the independent capital investment requirements.  These require an SPE’s outside 
investor to control a majority of the equity and own at least 3% of the total capital, in 
order to permit the assets and liabilities of sponsored SPEs to be removed from the 
sponsor’s balance sheet.  These requirements can easily be met and probably do not 
matter to auditing firms in any event—they do not publish public financial statements and 
any internal financial statements (or those supplied to third parties) can provide relevant 
disclosure to explain the arrangement.  
 
 Fourth, insurers are subject to specialized accounting and capital rules that 
regulate the circumstances under which obtaining reinsurance generates credits for their 
own risk profile.124  If they cannot be sure that transferring risk to an SPE will entitle 
them to such credits, the transactions are less appealing. This concern will not apply to 
auditors or their SIP affiliates because they are not subject to such regulation.  It 
nevertheless is worth describing, as it is implicated and addressed in existing IBS 
transactions by the approach to determining whether a catastrophe occurs, which can 
vary.  This variability can make audit firm IBS transactions more attractive.  
 
 Determining whether a catastrophe occurs for an IBS transaction essentially 
entails two specifications: what triggers a principal loss and by what formula the amount 
is determined.  For this purpose, it is common and useful to contrast indemnity from non-
indemnity coverage.  Under indemnity coverage, an insurer or reinsurer pays claims 
based on those actually incurred (say, actual earthquake-caused damages) whereas under 
non-indemnity coverage, the insurer or reinsurer pays claims based on the occurrence or 
non-occurrence of a particular event that is not necessarily related to actual incurred 
claims (say, an earthquake registering more than 7 on the Richter scale).  Cat bond deals 
can be designed either way.   
 
 In reinsurance practice, insurers generally prefer indemnity policies as they 
precisely cover losses actually incurred.  But re-insurers prefer non-indemnity policies to 
the extent that they face risks of poor underwriting decisions or claims management by 
insurers—forms of moral hazard.125  Non-indemnity approaches can neutralize moral 
                                                 
124 The GAO explains: 
 
In receiving “credit” for reinsurance, an insurance company may count the payments 
owed it from the reinsurance company on claims it has paid as an asset or as a deduction 
from liability. In doing so, a company can increase earnings reported on its financial 
statement and lower the amount of capital it needs to meet risk-based capital 
requirements established by regulators. The ability to record an asset or to take a 
deduction from gross liability for reinsurance is consequent upon the transfer of risk and 
can strongly affect an insurance company’s financial condition. 
 
GAO, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS, supra note ___, at 22-23. 
 
125 For catastrophe-bond investors, oversight capability may also be limited, leading them to favor non-
indemnity models too.  GAO, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS, supra note ___, at 18 (noting that cat 
bonds have generally been non-indemnity based to limit moral hazard).  This implication is discussed 
further below. 
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hazard.  They tie principal repayment not to actual claims, which may be infected by poor 
underwriting or by poor claims settlement procedures, but to objective external indicia of 
loss, such as a 7+Richter earthquake.126  The accounting treatment for the two approaches 
differs under specialized accounting regulations applicable to insurance companies.  The 
indemnity-based approach enables achieving so-called “underwriting accounting 
treatment,” meaning the insurer has ceded its exposure and gets credit as reinsurance—
another reason that insurers generally prefer it.127   
 
 That accounting treatment is more difficult to achieve using non-indemnity based 
approaches.  Under them, the ceding insurer is exposed to basis risk—the risk of a 
difference between payments received from the reinsurance coverage and actual losses 
(this can go either way, with more or less principal received compared to losses actually 
incurred).  To achieve underwriting accounting treatment for non-indemnity transfers, the 
insurer must design the model or method used to determine the trigger and amount so that 
the result bears a sufficiently close nexus to its associated actual claims to justify treating 
it as ceded (low basis risk). 
 
 While these problems have required cat bond market participants to struggle, they 
are essentially non-existent for auditing firms.  Their SIP affiliates are not subject to the 
same regulations or accounting rules as insurers and reinsurers.  From an accounting 
viewpoint, they need not worry about whether indemnity or non-indemnity methods are 
superior.  They and investors may have preferences as between the alternative models, of 
course, but that should make the vehicle more appealing rather than less.  In particular, 
experimentation and variation using the indemnity or non-indemnity approaches can be 
pursued to address various forms of moral hazard.128 
 
 Fifth, investor appetites are obviously crucial to creating any IBS transaction or 
market, including those for auditing firms.129  Investor appetites for IBS remain emergent 
rather than strong, for several reasons.  As noted, information costs can be high due to 
lack of familiarity.  True, the potential loss of principal in an IBS transaction can be 
conceptually analogized to the risk of loss on corporate bonds arising from corporate 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
126 Any of various objective tools can be invoked, including “industry loss indexes, parametric measures, 
and models of claims payments.”  GAO, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS, supra note ___, at 19. 
 
127  Id., at 23. 
 
128 One might wonder whether applicable insurance accounting could be improved to better capture the 
risk-transfer functions that securitization provides.  To the extent that non-indemnity approaches achieve 
risk reduction, accounting should reflect it, even if the ability to measure or model basis risk is limited.  
 
129 Nothing in law prevents investors, including mutual funds or other fiduciaries, from investing in cat 
bonds for their own account or the account of beneficiaries. See GAO, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS, 
supra note ___, at 29 (“[GAO] explored the potential for individual investors to purchase shares in mutual 
funds that purchase catastrophe bonds for inclusion . . .  in a mixed asset fund.  We . . . confirmed with the 
SEC that [applicable] rules and regulations do not preclude mutual funds from purchasing catastrophe 
bonds.”). 
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insolvency.  But investors have well-developed analytical tools for assessing that risk 
based on capital structure, leverage, cash flow coverage ratios and other traditional tools.  
It is more difficult for even the seasoned sophisticated investor to assess the probability 
and magnitude of catastrophic risks, whether of hurricanes or mega-audit failures.  
 
 For IBS to appeal to investors, they must be capable of evaluating such risk (in 
probability and magnitude), establishing the necessary return and assessing how that risk-
return relationship can contribute to investment portfolio diversification.  While some 
investors obviously have developed this capability and invested in IBS, additional 
resources are needed.  At present, two highly specialized professional groups are 
available to contribute expert assessments and translate related knowledge.   
 
 The first are risk-modeling firms, which ISB sponsors invariably retain to provide 
specialized risk evaluation appraisals.  Three major catastrophe-modeling firms have long 
served traditional reinsurers in assessing catastrophic risk.130  They have helped to 
develop the IBS market by contributing analysis for individual catastrophe bond 
offerings. These firms command considerable expertise, computing capability and 
statistical modeling tools.  Staffed with impressively educated professionals (many of 
whom hold Ph.D.s in relevant fields), they use massive databases on past catastrophes 
and related variables (such as population densities or construction techniques) to provide 
state-of-the-art risk assessments. 
 
 The second knowledge source is from rating agencies, which invariably are 
retained to rate catastrophe bonds.  Three major rating agencies have long served the 
bond markets in assessing investment risk (Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s). For 
IBS, they incorporate the analyses provided by the risk modelers and then extend or 
refine it and express the results in terms of investment risk.   Rating agency analyses 
vary, but generally assess probability of loss and magnitude.131  Catastrophe bonds have 
mostly been rated non-investment grade, although some have been rated investment 
grade and some have been structured using multiple tranches, with the senior tranche 
rated investment grade and the junior tranches below that.   
 
 Catastrophe bonds have been offered exclusively as private placements rather 
than public offerings.  Investors have been a relatively small group of sophisticated 
institutions.  Some of these include mutual funds, however, so individual investors have 
enjoyed an opportunity to participate indirectly in these vehicles.132  Mutual fund 
managers, in particular, have expressed appreciation for the diversification contribution 
that catastrophe bonds can make to a portfolio.133 
                                                 
130 These are: Applied Insurance Research Worldwide, Risk Management Solutions and EQECAT. 
 
131 Formulas may examine expected loss or frequency of loss.  GAO, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS, 
supra note ___, at 21 & n. 31.   
 
132 GAO, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS, supra note ___, at 18.   
 
133 Id. 
 
 45
 
 3.  Design Requirements — Apart from the foregoing challenges to developing 
the market and IBS structure, two additional design features are critical to making an IBS 
transaction work (and also require promoting investor understanding). First, the SPE 
must be bankruptcy-remote, meaning it would not be consolidated with the sponsor’s 
estate in the event of the latter’s bankruptcy.134   Investors would remain entitled to the 
contractual cash flows independent of the sponsor’s financial position (subject only to the 
designated catastrophic risks).   
 
 In asset-backed securitizations, such consolidation risk is addressed mainly by 
assuring that the initial transfer of assets is a “true sale” rather than a secured lending.  
That way, the sponsor’s creditors cannot claim any right to the transferred assets.   In a 
dispute, the investors would fight with the sponsor’s creditors over claims to those assets.  
IBS deals are easier because the sponsor transfers no assets at the outset.  Rather, an IBS 
sponsor’s creditors could at most claim some right to contractual payment obligations 
that the sponsor has to the SPE (essentially, premiums).  This risk is addressed by 
contractual provisions stating that, if the sponsor fails to pay premiums, then the coverage 
terminates and all principal is retained by the SPE for investors.   
 
 Premiums could cease in two different scenarios.  First, they could cease because 
of sponsor insolvency after a covered loss occurs.  In that case, the coverage is triggered 
and the funds are released pursuant to the contract.  No fight with sponsor creditors 
occurs.  Or premiums could cease because of insolvency arising for other reasons.  In that 
case, the coverage is not triggered and the SPE would seek to retain the funds for 
payment to investors.  This scenario can create competition with the sponsor’s other 
creditors.  Accordingly, ex ante assurance of bankruptcy remoteness remains important in 
IBS transactions.135 
 
 This point leads to a second requisite design feature for effective IBS deals and 
related investor understanding.  In asset-backed securitizations, investor principal upon 
closing is transferred to the sponsor in exchange for assets.  In IBS, reflecting the 
characteristic of an insurance arrangement, investor principal upon closing is held in the 
SPE and invested.  So in the former, the SPE is essentially passive (holding the assets and 
servicing them, with the servicing usually outsourced by contract back to the sponsor).  
For IBS, the SPE is more active: it holds assets, invests them, manages receipt of 
                                                 
134 Protected Cell Acts, adopted in 1999 by Illinois and Rhode Island and endorsed by NAIC, provide 
guidance that allow insurers to create “Protected Cells” within existing organizational structures to achieve 
bankruptcy-remoteness.  
 
135 For asset-backed securitizations sponsored by banks and other commercial enterprises, the usual 
bankruptcy law is the US Bankruptcy Code but, for IBS sponsors and perhaps their SPEs, state bankruptcy 
law governs in accordance with state insurance regulations.  See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2) (“domestic 
insurance company” not eligible to be a debtor under the US Bankruptcy Code, although not defining 
“domestic insurance company”); see In re Estate of Medicare HMO, 998 F.2d 436, 440-42 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(“The essential attribute of an insurance company under Illinois law, and the attribute prompting deference 
to state regulation, is the assumption [by the company in question] of a third party’s risk for a premium.”). 
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premiums and evaluates and settles claims arising under the coverage.  This requires 
attention to the SPE’s identity and management.  
 
 In particular, the SPE must be managed by experts possessing appropriate 
investment and management skill. Those managers must follow management and 
investment principles that assure the SPE’s safety and soundness.  As examples, they 
must assure that bond proceeds are invested prudently, assure that premiums are paid 
from the sponsor when due and that swap payments of the swap counterparty are paid 
when due.136  Assuring these traits and performance of these duties is principally a 
market problem—investors must scrutinize the manager and the management contract 
and avoid investing absent sufficient assurance of safety and soundness.137  
 
 4.  Illustration and Assessment — Consider for illustration a simple example of an 
IBS auditing transaction sponsored by one of the four large auditing firms (say Deloitte). 
Deloitte’s SIP affiliate creates a bankruptcy-remote SPE based in Bermuda.  The deal 
provides insurance to the Deloitte affiliate for the ensuing 12 months covering specified 
auditing-related events occurring during that period.  Investors contribute $250 million of 
principal amount in exchange for a floating interest rate of LIBOR +7%.   
 
 Investor risk of loss is either indemnity-based or non-indemnity based. If 
indemnity-based, it could provide that investors lose principal dollar-for-dollar if, during 
those 12 months, Deloitte settles or is adjudged liable in a single lawsuit alleging audit 
failure in which settlement or damages exceed $500 million.  If non-indemnity based, 
principal reductions could be determined by reference to any of various objective 
indicators outside the firm’s direct control.  An example would be if total settlements by 
or judgments against public auditing firms in the United States exceed $2 billion during 
that 12-month period, then investors release dollar-for-dollar in excess of that up to the 
total $250 million principal invested.138  In either case, an independent agent must be 
appointed to verify that a triggering event has occurred, akin to the provision in standard 
                                                 
136 Frankel & LaPlume, supra note ___, at 204. 
 
137 SPE management also can be a regulatory problem to the extent that state insurance regulation may 
apply to the SPE.  This probably is not a problem in general, Frankel & LaPlume, supra note ___, at 209-
210, but is not free from doubt.  For insurers at least, a Model Act drafted by the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) ordains the Special Purpose Reinsurance Vehicle (SPRV). The Model 
Act expressly provides that associated bonds are not insurance contracts while allowing that sponsoring 
insurers can create the SPRVs using corporate subsidiaries that are engaged in the “business of insurance.”  
Additional issues in structuring securitization transactions (whether asset-backed or insurance-based) 
include avoiding triggering the Investment Company Act and complying with other federal securities and 
commodities laws.  These are discussed in Frankel & LaPlume, supra note ___. 
 
138 As the example suggests, the indemnity approach reposes some discretion in the auditing firm and can 
create skewed incentives in settlement negotiations or litigation strategies that the non-indemnity method 
more readily can avoid.  As the example also suggests, these and many other contractual terms require 
specification on a scale akin to terms contained in manuscript and reinsurance policies.  The details are 
omitted here in the interest of introducing the IBS concept for catastrophic audit failure risk, not fully 
delineating it. 
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insurance agreements providing that an insured cannot agree to settle a claim without the 
insurer’s assent. 
 
 Proceeds from the securities issuance are deposited into a collateral trust account 
and invested in US-government guaranteed securities or highly-rated commercial paper 
(and the SPE enters into a suitable interest-rate swap with a credit-worthy counterparty).  
The securities are offered only to qualified institutional buyers as defined in SEC Rule 
144A.  The bonds are rated based, in part, on a risk analysis of a catastrophe-modeling 
firm and in part on rating agencies’ own investment risk assessment models.139 
__________ 
 
 Catastrophic risks are peculiar in that their frequency is low but their magnitude is 
huge.  The consequence of this peculiarity for insurers is that the cost of re-insurance can 
be significantly higher than for other pools.  For some coverage, this can mean that 
reinsurers simply lack sufficient capital to meet aggregate risks.  An example concerns 
the risk of floods in certain coastal environments, and explains why the US government 
developed government-backed flood insurance programs.  For such contexts, insurance 
securitization can be particularly appealing.  It vastly expands the private capital 
available to meet aggregate risks beyond the limits of re-insurers into the vastly greater 
limits of the capital markets themselves.   
 
 For auditing, to the extent that it is true that audit firms, their SIP affiliates or 
reinsurers lack sufficient capital resources to meet catastrophic risks, then it is appealing 
to consider devices to transfer and distribute that risk to the broader base of the capital 
markets.   It adds an additional layer of insurance on top of primary insurance, self-
insurance and reinsurance and taps not just insurance markets but capital markets too.  
This expands pooling and distribution of risk and increases diversification compared to 
traditional insurance.140  Adding IBS to address catastrophic risks of audit failure also 
should reduce the volatility in insurance markets that auditors have faced for decades and 
that is an important basis for the insurance-based arguments in favor of establishing ex 
ante damages caps on auditor liability for audit failure.  
 
 Risks of adverse selection essentially disappear because any given auditing cat 
bond issue is based on the risks facing a single auditing firm (although comprised of 
                                                 
139 Compare this illustration with the actual transaction in Redwood Capital I, Ltd. sponsored by Lehman 
Re, a reinsurance company.  GAO, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS, supra note ___, at 21-22.  It provided 
insurance for 12 months covering specified earthquake losses to property in California.  Investors were 
exposed to potential loss of principal of $160 million. The bonds bore a floating interest rate of 
LIBOR+5.5% and LIBOR+7%.  Investor risk of loss was non-indemnity based.  Any principal reductions 
were to be determined by reference to the Property Claim Services (PCS) index, a recognized industry 
indicator of insured property for catastrophic losses.  The SPE provided reinsurance coverage for California 
earthquake risk for triggering events causing industry losses ranging from $22.5 billion to $31.5 billion as 
PCS reports estimated for the period.  Moody’s rated the bond Ba2 (non-investment-grade). 
 
140 ISB expands capacity beyond that available using E&O or SIPs, although not necessarily compared to 
using FSI.  As noted earlier, the risks that FSI insures can be hedged using option markets. See supra note 
___; Ronen, supra note ___, at 15-16.   
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many members in the network).  Risks of moral hazard are addressed in several ways.  
First, the IBS layer is designed for the catastrophic event not the quotidian case.  External 
insurance and SIPs cover the main risks.  As in the preceding illustration, IBS for 
auditing transactions set the effective coverage as a designated dollar amount (say $250 
million) in excess of an underlying amount covered by other insurance (including self-
insurance), such as $500 million.  Second, the indemnity or non-indemnity features 
relating to the payout trigger and amounts can be tailored accordingly.  Finally, there 
should remain sufficient risk independence and risk-variability to enable the product to 
function effectively as insurance.141  Of course, some moral hazard will remain even after 
taking account of these tools.142 
 
 For insurers or auditors, funding IBS bond interest and distributing loss risk to 
investors is functionally equivalent to the cost they would incur if they chose to distribute 
the risk using traditional reinsurance policies.  If IBS can attract investors at interest rates 
in the range of, say, LIBOR+7% (as they have in the general catastrophe bond market), 
then this will be attractive so long as actual or functional reinsurance costs are greater 
than that.  
 
 The interest rate demanded on auditing cat bonds of the various firms reflects the 
relative degree of risk each firm faces.   This introduces the numerous advantages of 
capital market discipline.  First, since audit failure losses are paid, in part, by capital 
market investors, capital market monitoring of auditing firm performance appears.  This 
amounts to a sort of re-bundling of the risk-monitoring and risk-distribution functions.  
The capital markets as a whole effectively self-insure.   
 
 Second, investors will require auditing firms to furnish more information than 
they presently do concerning loss exposure.  Note, however, that the required information 
is not the auditors’ assets or net worth or other information provided in financial 
statements but rather the firms’ historical loss risk experience (such as lawsuits filed and 
settled or regulatory investigations conducted and resolved).  Auditors may be willing to 
share some such information, despite their traditional unwillingness to disclose publicly 
complete financial information.  After all, these transactions would be private 
placements, thus limiting public disclosure, and the required disclosure would relate to 
risks of catastrophic loss without requiring complete financial statements that firms 
consider to be proprietary.   
                                                 
141 Catastrophe bonds covering natural catastrophic events such as earthquakes and floods very likely tend 
to satisfy the condition of statistical independence.  Frankel & LaPlume, supra note ___, at 205.  Auditing 
bonds relating to insurance covering audit failure should satisfy the condition as well.  So long as there is 
no correlation (or correlation is not strong) between substantive business and economic risks and the risk of 
audit failure, then securitized bonds should offer investment diversification.   
 
142 As noted, FSI reduces moral hazard near to the vanishing point when accompanied by the hedging 
strategy that uses options that apply to the stock of a specific audit client and can be priced accordingly.  
See supra notes ___ & ___; Ronen, supra note ___, at 15-16.  In contrast, an IBS transaction is a strategy 
applicable to all an issuing audit firm’s clients and would be priced on the basis of that entire book of 
business. 
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 Third, this would redefine the relationship between auditing firms and capital 
market investors.  At present, capital market investors may too often treat auditing firms 
as insurers of financial reporting, despite limited auditor ability to perform that function 
and limited resources to support it.  When investors buy auditing firm cat bonds, they 
have an additional direct interest in reducing the frequency and magnitude of audit 
failure.  In addition to increased monitoring of audit firm performance, this could induce  
monitoring and control over plaintiffs’ lawyers to deter pursuing excessive damages 
claims against auditors, which is an important adjunct of the insurance-based arguments 
favoring damages caps for auditors. 
 
 Securitizing audit failure risk could also contribute to curbing the problem of 
pocket shifting prevalent in securities fraud class actions today. This occurs when an 
issuer suffering market price drops due to financial misstatement pays one class of 
shareholders at the expense of another class, depending on fortuities of the timing of 
stock trades.143  With IBS for auditing, at least for federal securities class actions against 
auditors for audit failure, the pocket shifting may persist but an additional cash flow 
stream enters.  In this cash flow-stream, funds flow out of one pocket and back into that 
same pocket.144 True, significant transaction and agency costs remain, especially in 
lawyers’ fees.  But the current critique of pocket shifting worries about how the shift is 
from one pocket of shareholders to a different pocket of shareholders.  With IBS for 
auditing, the pocket, through self-insurance, stays in substantially the same position (net 
of transaction and agency costs). 
 
  Finally, an IBS transaction is relatively simple for an auditing firm to complete 
compared to the political and structural challenges necessary either to establish caps on 
damages or implement novel reforms such as adopting a regime of financial statement 
insurance.  True, some political resistance may appear, but it likely can be overcome.  For 
example, the Reinsurance Association of America views IBS as a direct competitor and 
so has emphasized in lobbying efforts that the reinsurance industry has abundant capacity 
and that IBS should be seen, at most, as a supplement not an alternative to reinsurance.145  
On the other side, the Bond Market Association (BMA) is enthusiastic about IBS and 
discounts concerns about why investors may not find them attractive and urges increasing 
their appeal through more favorable US federal income tax treatment.146  Auditing firms 
                                                 
143 See Coffee, supra note ___. 
 
144 Suppose that Fund (a mutual fund) buys common stock of Issuer (a large industrial corporation) which 
is, in turn, audited by Firm (a large auditing firm).  Suppose Fund also buys one-year Firm IBS.  If no audit 
failure occurs by Firm at Issuer during that year, Fund enjoys its return on Issuer’s stock (uninfected by 
audit failure) plus a high-bond interest return and return of principal on the Firm IBS.  But if an audit 
failure does occur during that year, Fund suffers a reduced return on its Issuer stock and principal on the 
bonds—but if and only if that same amount is used to fund reimbursement to it of its losses on Issuer stock.  
It is far from a perfect hedge, but it reduces the naked risk of owning Issuer stock without any other 
financial instrument related to the quality of its audits.    
 
145 GAO, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS, supra note ___, at 28 & 30. 
 
146 Id. at 31. 
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who find IBS enticing will enjoy a similar reception: the MBA will welcome them but 
the RAA (and the reinsurers of the firms’ SIP affiliates) may demur.147 
 
CONCLUSION 
  
 Policy debate over capping auditor damages in securities litigation, dating to the 
1970s, implicates the perennial issue concerning the relative expense or limited 
availability to auditors of external insurance.  As evidence, proponents cite the 
contraction of E&O markets for auditing insurance and the rise of auditing firm self-
insurance programs.  Analysis of this insurance-based argument suggests that it is 
overstated in that self-insurance is better at promoting audit effectiveness—and financial 
statement insurance would be better yet.  The legitimate target in the debate is the threat 
of catastrophic risks, the mega case that would destroy a firm and jeopardize the auditing 
industry.  That concern might be addressed by caps, but this has been a political and 
policy thicket for nearly 40 years. 
 
 The concern and analysis entice asking: what else besides caps might be used?  
After all, the problem is not sui generis and caps are not the only solution.   Catastrophic 
risks with limited or expensive insurance or reinsurance arise from natural phenomena 
like hurricanes, earthquakes, floods and tornados.  Some such events—like Hurricane 
Andrew and the Northridge Earthquake—rivet insurers and yield very hard insurance 
markets.  In response to those two events, in particular, insurers and other businesses 
turned to the capital markets and invented insurance-based securitization as an alternative 
or supplement to reinsurance.  This innovation can be adapted easily to the auditing 
context.  Firms likely would be better off—and their contributions to financial reporting 
more effective—by pursuing catastrophe bond securitizations rather than continuing the 
campaign to secure caps on damages that they face for audit failure. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
147 Purely as a matter of speculation, this could help to explain why, to the extent that the concept is 
appealing in principle, it has not been adopted in practice. 
 
